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Editorial Mission of JEEMS 
Objectives  
The Journal for East European Management Studies (JEEMS) is designed to 
promote a dialogue between East and West over issues emerging from 
management practice, theory and related research in the transforming societies 
of Central and Eastern Europe.  
It is devoted to the promotion of an exchange of ideas between the academic 
community and management. This will contribute towards the development of 
management knowledge in Central and East European countries as well as a 
more sophisticated understanding of new and unique trends, tendencies and 
problems within these countries. Management issues will be defined in their 
broadest sense, to include consideration of the steering of the political-economic 
process, as well as the management of all types of enterprise, including profit-
making and non profit-making organisations. 
The potential readership comprises academics and practitioners in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Western Europe and North America, who are involved or 
interested in the management of change in Central and Eastern Europe.  
Editorial Policy 
JEEMS is a refereed journal which aims to promote the development, 
advancement and dissemination of knowledge about management issues in 
Central and East European countries. Articles are invited in the areas of 
Strategic Management and Business Policy, the Management of Change (to 
include cultural change and restructuring), Human Resources Management, 
Industrial Relations and related fields. All forms of indigenous enterprise within 
Central and Eastern European will be covered, as well as Western Corporations 
which are active in this region, through, for example, joint ventures. Reports on 
the results of empirical research, or theoretical contributions into recent 
developments in these areas will be welcome. 
JEEMS will publish articles and papers for discussion on actual research 
questions, as well as book reviews, reports on conferences and institutional 
developments with respect to management questions in East Germany and 
Eastern Europe. In order to promote a real dialogue, papers from East European 
contributors will be especially welcome, and all contributions are subject to 
review by a team of Eastern and Western academics.  
JEEMS will aim, independently, to enhance management knowledge. It is 
anticipated that the dissemination of the journal to Central and Eastern Europe 
will be aided through sponsoring. 
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Albanien, Polen, Slowenien, Tschechien: Makro- und 
Mikroperspektiven zur betrieblichen und 
gesellschaftlichen Transformation in vier Ländern 
Das zweite Heft im neuen Jahrtausend beschäftigt sich sowohl mit dem 
betrieblichen als auch mit dem überbetrieblichen Transformationsprozeß. Die 
Beiträge zeigen, daß der Transformationsprozeß nach wie vor vom Versuch der 
Mittel- und Osteuropäischen Länder geprägt ist, westliche Gesellschafts- und 
Wirtschaftsinstitutionen zu übernehmen, um Anschluß an die westliche Welt zu 
erlangen. Gleichwohl, auch das wird in den Beiträgen angesprochen, ist ein 
solches Vorgehen nicht unproblematisch. Einerseits läßt sich die sozialistische 
Vergangenheit nicht einfach radikal ersetzen und zum anderen ist nicht geklärt, 
was denn die richtigen westlichen Konzepte sind, und ob eine Übertragung, i.S. 
einer simplen Kopie, überhaupt sinnvoll ist. Die betriebliche Praxis in Mittel- 
und Osteuropa, so glauben wir, zeigt schon eine erste Lösung auf, die selektive 
und betriebsspezifische Übernahme westlicher Managementkonzepte und –
methoden und deren bewußte Verknüpfung mit tradierten „sozialistischen“ 
Arbeits- und Leitungsmethoden.  
Wir freuen uns besonders, in diesem Heft wieder einmal einen Artikel aus 
Albanien zu haben. Vasilika Kume und Shyqyri Llaci geben einen Überblick 
über die Albanische Wirtschaft vor und während der Transformation. Damit 
versuchen sie, den gesellschaftlichen Transformationsprozeß Albaniens zu 
verdeutlichen und dabei zu analysieren, welche Maßnahmen notwendig sind, 
diesen Prozeß positiv zu stabilisieren. 
Izabela Robinson und Beata Tomczak-Stepien präsentieren uns die Ergebnisse 
einer Fallstudie zur kulturellen Transformation von Unternehmen. Sie 
analysieren die Kultur von vier polnischen Unternehmen und zeigen, daß die 
Eigentumsverhältnisse, das Humankapital sowie die Managementphilosophie 
und –ideologie die Schlüsselfaktoren in der Entwicklung marktorientierter 
Verhaltensweisen sind. Jedoch zeigen Robinson und Tomczak-Stepien auch, daß 
Elemente sozialistischer Kultur einen starken und anhaltenden Einfluß ausüben. 
Der dritte Artikel in dieser Ausgabe beschäftigt sich mit der strategischen 
Nutzung von Informationstechnologien in kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen in 
Slowenien. Dušan Lesjak zeigt, zu welchem Grad slowenische KMU 
Informationstechnologien strategisch nutzen und welchen Effekt dies z.B. auf 
das finanzielle Ergebnis hat. 
Eleanor M Maitland-Davies und Brian Kenny, die Autoren des Schlußartikels, 
untersuchen die Motive für die Wahl von Joint Ventures an Stelle anderer 
möglicher Formen der Zusammenarbeit britischer mit tschechischen Firmen. Die 
Autoren fokussieren dabei auf organisationale Motive (z.B. die Suche nach 
Ressourcen), Motive, die den Partner betreffen (z.B. der Grad der Autonomität 
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der Firmen), und exogene Motive, wie z.B. Möglichkeiten der finanziellen 
Unterstützung durch Förderprogramme. 
Im Teil „News and Information“ des Heftes haben wir diesmal u.a. einen 
ausführlichen Bericht zur Konferenz „Financial Development in Eastern Europe: 
The First Ten Years“. Obwohl diese Konferenz eher volkwirtschaftliche 
Aspekte adressiert ist es immer wieder interessant, die Ergebnisse anderer 
Wissenschaftsdisziplinen zu erfahren, die sich auch mit der Entwicklung in 
Mittel- und Osteuropa beschäftigen  und wichtige Rahmenbedingungen für die 
Entwicklung des Managements in den Mittel- und Osteuropäischen Staaten 
erforschen. 
Wir wünschen Ihnen viel Spaß beim Lesen des Heftes! 
Rainhart Lang 
Ingo Winkler 
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Albania, an ex-communist country during the transition 
period: problems and challenges* 
Vasilika Kume / Shyqyri Llaci** 
This paper intends to give a brief history of the Albanian Economy before and 
during the transition period, to analyze the transformation of Albanian Society 
toward an economy based on private property and the free initiative of free 
people, and to highlight some of the problems and challenges Albania is 
currently facing. The aim of this article is to tell what could be some of the ways 
for a fast recovery and steady development of our country. 
In diesem Artikel wird die Geschichte der albanischen Ökonomie vor und 
während der Übergangsperiode kurz dargestellt. Damit verbunden ist die 
Analyse der Umwandlung der albanischen Gesellschaft hin zu einer Ökonomie, 
die auf Privateigentum und der freien Initiative freier Menschen beruht, wobei 
einige Probleme und Herausforderungen aufgezeigt werden, die in Albanien 
aktuell sind. In diesem Artikel sollen einige der Wege, die zu einer schnellen 
Erholung und nachhaltigen Entwicklung unseres Landes führen könnten, 
gewiesen werden. 
                                          
* Manuscript received: 5.3.1999, revised: 10.2.2000, accepted: 14.2.2000; 
** Shyqyri Llaci, born 1959, Prof.Assoc. Dr., Senior lecturer in “Business Organization and 
Management” and “Theory of Organization and Management”. Department of 
Management, Faculty of Economics (Tirana University). Major areas of interest: Business 
Management, Organizational Change and Development, Theory of Management. 
Vasilika Kume, born 1955, Prof.Assoc. Dr., Senior lecturer in “Strategic Management” and 
“Managerial Decision Making”. Department of Management, Faculty of Economics 
(Tirana University). Major areas of interest: Comparative Organizational Strategies. 
Management in Joint Ventures, Managing Change. 
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Background on Albania 
Albania is located in the Balkan Peninsula in southeastern Europe, on the 
Eastern Shore of the Strait of Otranto across from the “boot heel” of Italy. 
Former Yugoslavia borders on the north and east, Greece on the South, and the 
Adriatic and Ionian seas on the West. The smallest of the Balkan Countries, it 
has an area of about 28, 000 square meters. 
Albania crosses a vertical line extended from South to North, to link thus 
Northern and Central Europe with one of its extremities, Greece  
Albania is a predominantly mountainous country. Roughly, three-fourths of its 
territory in the north, south and central regions, consist of mountains and hills 
full of streams, rivers and lakes. In contrast to the rugged terrain and limited 
arable land in the mountainous regions, the western plains beside the Adriatic 
sea, endow Albania with a wealth of natural resources, including chromium (5 
percent of the total world reserves), copper, iron, oil, bauxite, phosphate, 
asbestos, coal, marble and clays. Since the transition began about eight years 
ago, the mining of these materials has been barely operational. 
In one pagan legend of Albanians, it is said that, after creating the world, God 
was left with a sack of stones and rocks and did not know where to throw it. He 
shook the sack once or twice unresolvedly and threw it down on lands where 
forever Albanians live. 
This story is told by Albanians whenever they are fed up with troubles they have 
to encounter on this strip of land, not so wide, rough mountains, historically 
poor and permanently attacked by others, while others, even in two thousand 
years, never have been attacked by them. And whenever they escape bad luck, 
they repent for harsh words and call their Motherland a beautiful and brittle 
bride, looking to the future, which for Albanian brides as for Albania itself is 
insecure and full of puzzles. 
The distinct geographic strategic position has confronted the Albanian people 
with long and violent occupations by ambitious peoples like ancient Romans, 
Turks in the Middle Ages, Italians and Germans in our Century. It is a fact 
already recognized now by Albanians and foreign analysts that the five-century 
occupation of Albania by the Ottoman Empire has been a decisive factor for the 
destruction of the Albanian Economy. 
Albanians have suffered too much from oppression during their history.  One 
feeling was however not suppressed, and this gradually became a main feature 
of Albanians: national feeling. As centuries were passing, in the complicated 
Balkan context, where oriental and western cultures were differentiated and 
matched, where entire populations were assimilated and new ones acquired, this 
feeling grew stronger. Representatives of the Albanian Renaissance, a handful of 
idealists in the century-long darkness of the Ottoman Empire, worked hard to 
raise national consciousness, permanently pressing on this idea.   
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Only in 1912, Albania won independence from the Turkish Empire. Neither the 
monarchic regime of King Zog, nor the communists of E.Hoxha could make 
Albania a European country, as it deserved to be a long time ago. 
Cultivated patriotic and collectivist sentiment has been more successfully used 
by Albanian communists than in other eastern countries, for Albania was rather 
compact. They found a ready-made basis to establish their totalitarian regime, 
which is closer to perfection in peoples with strong collectivist sentiment, like in 
Germans for instance or in Serbians, as they were realized from relatively 
tolerant obligations of Tito’s Yugoslavia. 
During the 11-year period of the kingdom (1928-1939), Albania could not create 
the capitalist mentality as it existed in civilized Europe. Even those few 
capitalist elements created during these years were eliminated by the communist 
regime “rich” with the traditions of an extremely centralized economy. This 
regime not only extinguished the capitalist seed inherited from the past, but it 
did not allow at all their recreation and its access as happened in Hungary, 
Poland and elsewhere. So, from this point of view in Albania, there has existed 
not simply institutional emptiness, but also emptiness in the mentality of this 
society.  
The Albanian economy during the communist regime 
The Albanian communist regime (1945 - 1990) has often been defined as “the 
stronghold of Stalinism”. In fact, the productive model applied after World War 
2 by Enver Hoxha, has its roots in Stalin’s  policy, whose salient characteristics 
were:  
 Authoritarian and centralized economic planning.  
 Industrialization giving pre-eminence to heavy industry.  
 Forced collectivization of agriculture.  
 Nationalization of industry and commerce. 
 The use of coercion through police and secret services to ensure strict 
control over society.  
 Frequent recourse to political “purges”. 
 Absolute hegemony of the communist party.  
 The strengthening and extension of the administrative and bureaucratic 
apparatus, which served as “conveyer belts” to the party leadership, and   
 The leader’s personality cult. 
However, the peculiarity of Albanian communism, with respect to other eastern 
bloc countries, came from the strong nationalistic push for independence which 
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conditioned all the main decisions taken, regarding both domestic and foreign 
policy, so much so that it was to be defined “National Communism”. 
Indeed, the system of central planning of the economy and the control, applied 
by the State Party, had no equal in the whole of Eastern Europe. The choice of a 
strong centralizing government and recourse to radical solutions in building up 
the socialist system, were natural in a country which had known conditions 
similar to anarchy, weakened by clan and tribe sectarianism, where poverty, 
illiteracy and superstition predominated, and whose economic life was primitive 
and disorganized. In the old semi-feudal society, the workers lacked the 
discipline and industriousness necessary for the country’s rapid development. A 
strong centralized state was therefore considered essential for transforming the 
country’s manpower into a united workforce, overcoming the problem of 
negligence and individualism, ensuring a more rapid growth in industrialization 
and to fight possible opposition. 
The policy of self-reliance and the extreme isolation of the country, especially 
during the 1970s and 1980s brought about the interruption of financial support 
from abroad, so hindering every kind of accumulation of resources for capital 
investment. With an industry based upon old technology and with a backward 
agriculture, the signs of the crisis became obvious in the 1980s and it burst out 
in all its components in the year 1990. Very high inflation, a deep decrease of 
the GDP (about 50 percent), the accelerated growth of unemployment, as well as 
the general disintegration of the balance of foreign trade, in the period 1991-
1992, were the main consequences of economic collapse.  
The general crisis with economic, political and social dimensions was 
accompanied by a people’s uprising, which having as vanguard the movement of 
the students in December 1990, forced the communist leadership to accept 
political pluralism. The communist party won this election, but the wave of 
popular protests presented a big obstacle for it to govern the country. The first 
non-communist government, based on an agreement between different political 
parties was created in June 1991. This government had a short life of only five 
months. It only started the liberalization of prices, of the rate of exchange, the 
privatization of land and of some public services.    
The transformation of Albanian society toward the free market 
economy. 
Numerous analysts are investigating factors and causes of collapse of the 
socialist system in eastern countries. Without going into depth in such an article, 
we would like to deal with those occurrences, which follow such major shifts as 
the overturning of political and social systems. Maybe it is one of the rare cases 
in the history of mankind that one system replaces its opposite without bloody 
revolutions and massive victims. 
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Perhaps the most important and true change this time evolved within the human 
being. Imagine a person born in 1947. At kindergarten, where he is sent at least 
xat the age of three years old, the first verse learnt is dedicated to the Labor 
Party, which according to it is his second mother. As he grows up, he learns in 
school and everywhere he goes, new concepts about communism as the best 
system in the world, about the bad people of this world, that more or less are 
rich people, blood suckers, etc. 
What he hears from parents is, be careful, don’t talk outside about what you hear 
at home, don’t talk to that person because he has a bad biography. (Which 
means he has relatives who have been rich or connected with fascists in the 
past). 
The person grows up and goes to work. He spends his youth in the agitation of 
excitement for building Socialist Fatherland. He begins to be afraid quite early. 
Afraid of slips of the tongue, of classmates, of social curb, of relatives that might 
be imprudent regarding their conviction and devotion to the party and might 
make a blunder, thus be interned and imprisoned, then necessarily he himself 
would be interned and imprisoned. 
Imagine now how these people are confronted with a reality entirely different, 
quite opposite of the one they have lived in all their life? 
In various aspects, Albania has represented a unique case compared with other 
eastern countries, an extreme version of Marxism-Leninism with numerous local 
ties linked with both the strong national identity of the Albanians and with 
Hoxha’s attempt to build a communist society of Albanian nature. 
Even “Albanian transition”, as far as the strength of its impact and the speed of 
the transformation is concerned, might be seen as a kind of an extreme case 
within the framework of the more general transformation phenomenon occurring 
in eastern countries.  
Albania was the latest communist country that entered the road of economic 
transformation. Apart from the ups-and-downs and the intensity of the political 
processes in Albania, which undoubtedly has its reflection in the trend of 
economic reform, the first serious economic steps toward a market-oriented 
economy began after the first pluralistic elections in March 1991. This might be 
considered as the first phase of the Albanian economic reform accompanied by a 
lot of controversies, confusion, half measures and, above all, a virtual political 
instability. 
The general elections of March 22, 1992, were finalized by the victory of the 
Democratic Party. A new government assumed office in April 1992, starting a 
new comprehensive reform program. The program was carried out in two 
phases. From mid-1992 to mid-1993, during a one-year program, fiscal and 
monetary control combined with comprehensive price and exchange system 
reforms was introduced. The program was generously supported by various 
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international financial and technical sources. An important element was the 
support and remittances sent by the Albanians working abroad. After the good 
implementation of the almost one year emergency program, a medium term 
program was presented in the parliament in November 1993 for the 1993-1996 
period. 
Until 1996, Albania seemed to belong to the transition “success stories”. The 
GDP evolution placed Albania in the group of leaders. The growth in 1995 was 
reported at 13.4 percent, one of the highest rates in the world. After a severe 
drop between 1990 and 1992 to 65 percent of the 1990 level, the economy was 
rapidly growing since 1993 and reached already 86 percent of the level of 1990. 
However, with 675$ of GDP per capita in 1995, this small country of 3.4 million 
citizens, remained the poorest in Europe. Two other indicators were impressive: 
the inflation rate, which was 31 percent in 1993, 16 percent in 1994, 6 percent in 
1995. And with a private sector, representing at least 60 percent of the GDP, 
Albania could be considered as one of the most privatized transition countries, 
comparable to Poland and Hungary. 
Other indicators that would present a more balanced picture could confirm these 
results. According to foreign investment, the place of Albania in that period was 
rather modest, with a global stock of 130 million FDI, i.e. 38$ per capita. 
However, this level was comparable with Poland or Croatia. The main investors 
were Italy and Greece, mainly in light industry (textile and shoes) and 
infrastructure. There were other investments in tourism (Austria, France). EU 
(EBRD, Phare Program, and EIB) mainly provided foreign funding. At the end 
of 1995, regarding the synthetic transition indicator (the sum of EBRD indices), 
Albania rated at 21, i.e. rather far from the leaders with 31 (Czech Republic and 
Hungary). The rank of Albania was equal to Uzbekistan, just behind Macedonia 
and Romania, and just before Ukraine.  
As the table shows, Albania’s good marks were on the easiest (but very 
important) items: price and trade liberalization, small privatization, (the 
indicators do not consider the specific privatization in agriculture; if they did, 
Albania’s image would be better). The weaknesses were on the institutional side 
of transition, on large privatization and enterprise restructuring, all items 
reflecting the depth of the development of the market economy. However, the 
steps that were made were sufficient to launch private initiative and to start to 
modernize the country. In that time, Albania has started to build the financial 
sector. Two of the three state banks were planned to be privatized by 1997, and 
five foreign banks were operating in the country. In April 1996, the Anglo 
Adriatic Fund, the first private investment fund for privatization bondholders 
was created. In May 1996, a first stock market, trading only privatization 
government bonds, started. 
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 1 2 3 4 
Large-scale privatization  X   
Small-scale privatization    X 
Enterprise restructuring  X   
Price liberalization   X  
Trade and foreign exchange system    X 
Competition policy X    
Securities markets & non bank financial institutions X    
Legal rules of investments  X   
How to characterize the Albanian transition? How to explain its success? There 
are three features to the Albanian path to the market economy: strong support of 
the population, a radical liberal orientation, and a strong extroversion of the 
economy.  
The communist regime in Albania was especially tough and the willingness of 
the population to leave the past and to enter the market economy system was 
high.  It gives strong political credit to post-communist government. 
Moreover, this political credit allowed the government to launch a radical 
reform. The Albanian reform could be characterized as quick and liberal. The 
price and trade liberalization, the cut of subsidies happened in a few months and 
the economic policy became very orthodox according to IMF recommendations. 
The dominant philosophy was the less state, the better. The concept of 
privatization was also radical. The aim to privatize almost everything would 
reduce the state sector to the smallest minimum. The result of this policy was 
strong growth and disequilibrium. The shock for the economy was very hard, 
industrial production fell in 1992 by 60 percent and 10 percent in 1993. The 
GDP drop was 35 percent; real wages fell 30 percent between 1990 and 1993. 
Unemployment jumped officially to 26.5 percent at the end of 1992, and in 
cities, the global underemployment was at least twice as high: 50 percent of the 
active population was jobless. But already in 1993, GDP increased. Growth was 
led by agriculture, construction and by small private services. 
The third feature of Albanian reform is its extroversion. It means that inside 
Albania consumption was much higher than production: the differences were 
provided by outside sources, by private transfers and emigration. Aid was 
equivalent to 40 percent of GDP in 1992, 20 percent in 1993 and 12 percent in 
1994. Incomes from 400,000 emigrants working in Greece and Italy, are 
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estimated at 400 million $ per year, 25 percent of GDP in 1994, and around 15-
20 percent in 1996. 
However, apart from the success of the reform, the achievements of it appear to 
have been rather hollow. The financial sector remained underdeveloped and the 
willingness of the ex-government to implement reforms and comply with IMF 
and World Bank requirements masked reality.  In fact, apparent economic 
success depended in large part on remittances from the workforce living abroad, 
large-scale smuggling and money laundering and the short-term profits from the 
pyramid schemes. This situation seemed to continue for a relatively long period. 
But the situation began to get out of control since the contested elections of May 
1996 and after the repression of the opposition in the main square of the capital 
(“Scanderbeg square”). In the economic context, it was the time when the 
pyramid schemes had passed their point of maturity and they were running fast 
toward bankruptcy. Within few months, everything built up for several years 
seemed to be ruined. All that international investment did not give its fruits and 
the country was again near the abyss. The land of the eagles began to be called 
the “land of kallashnikovi”. During and after the election of June 1997, when the 
socialists and their allies won the absolute majority in the new parliament a “hot 
debate” is continuing about the causes of the Albanian catastrophe.  
This debate continues even today and not only the politicians, but the analysts 
too, often do not share the same opinion for the evaluation of economic reform 
in Albania. Perhaps, this is due to the Albanian climate, which is loaded more 
than is necessary by political influences. Below we will try to escape from 
political influences of this kind and will stay within the frame of technocrats. 
The crisis of spring 1997 and its causes 
The years that came after the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe 
and in Albania have shown clearly that the success or failure of reforming steps 
should be seen closely linked with the specific conditions, as well as with the 
historical experience of the region.  
After this, a logical question is raised: Did Albania adopt the rules of the game 
according to that of a market economy, or was everything allowed to happen in a 
spontaneous way? What would have happened in an environment where the old 
rules did not exist any more and the new ones were drafted only on paper?  
Let us try to analyze several moments of economic reform in Albania, with the 
aim of discovering the main causes of Albanian crisis. 
In the chaotic situation, after the spring unrest of 1997 and the events that 
followed it, it seemed as if the economy, politics and the whole Albanian society 
were frozen and here and there, sunshine was seen at the end of the tunnel. In 
fact, the social agreement between the Albanian political forces and the 
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successful realization of parliamentary elections were uncontested hopes for 
bringing into normalization the economic and social life of the country.  
The causes of economic crisis in spring 1997 in Albania have been commented 
on  in different ways from different analysts from a variety of areas and with 
different interests behind them. But let us try to analyze some of the main causes 
from the technocratic point of view: 
 During these years, Albania has adopted a legal framework in which the local 
government was very closely controlled by the central government. So in 
Albania there was born a powerless local government, unable to present itself as 
the materialization of the people’s will and accountable for the fundamental 
developments of the society itself.  
 The governmental structure of the country (including the political opposition, 
too) which was the first to cope with the crises of pyramid schemes as a 
precursor of political demands that accompanied the civil unrest in February-
March 1997, was unable to absorb immediately the people’s demands. It showed 
lack of flexibility and adopted with delay the political changes that were asked 
for by the people.  
 The legal framework and the institutions started to be set up rapidly aiming at 
European standards. Such laws were very good often only on paper, because the 
level of their implementation in practice was very low. The question was not 
simply having a very modern legislation, but first of all implementing it in 
reality. It would be better to have a not very modern legal framework, but for it 
to be applicable and the citizens to see its implementation as a precondition to 
enter into the European family.  
 Under the conditions of a relatively full legal framework, but not really in 
full implementation, in these first years of transition there were possible the 
creation and the existence of inefficient business networks, not competitive but 
in monopolist positions and even with discrimination power. This kind of 
business network, in which we can include the partial or full pyramid schemes, 
unbalanced in an obvious way the market ratios, the shift of capital from one 
branch to another and hindered the real economic growth of the country.  
 The capital inherited from the socialist past could not be fully restructured in 
order to be suitable for the market economy, while the human capital, being 
unsuitable for the new economy, as well as, being forced from the poverty and 
lack of jobs was transferred to neighboring countries. It must not be forgotten 
here the “shrinking” of the state property through the special board’s decisions 
for this purpose and the creation on this basis of a stratum of new entrepreneurs 
within a relatively short time. In many cases, this stratum was not able to put in 
use that part of national wealth that passed into their hands. First of all, this was 
due to lack of entrepreneurs’ abilities to manage this wealth according to the 
rules of the market economy.   
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 So, in these first years of transition there was not only an institutional and 
organization vacuum, but also a weak intervention of the state in the economy. In 
other words, the new system in which our country entered after the 1990s 
displayed a vacuum, which was filled by the informal sector in all the areas of 
activity. Here are the main causes for the large extension of this sector in the 
Albanian economy.  
 Despite the reservations that we may have, the privatization of small and 
medium enterprises, should be considered as the most successful step toward the 
market economy on the road to setting up the institutions of this kind of 
economy. But the private property created in this period was not able to find the 
incentives of real economic growth, to stop the overconsumption and to reduce 
in an economic way the informal sector. As a consequence, the productive 
resources were not used with sufficient efficiency; consumption of all kinds was 
increased artificially and the economy went inevitably towards a general crisis.  
 The reforms are successful when experts manage them with a mentality 
qualitatively different from that of the pre-democratic period. It was a fact, that 
in Albania the tradition of appointing people on the basis of party merits and not 
on professional ones continued. Coming from a fifty-year dictatorship, and used 
to managing with the old methods of dictate and of the party spirit, it was 
understandable that the Albanians would not change in a radical way and within 
few years this style of management. But this would be only half of a bad thing, 
if the people in power would have gathered around themselves those who were 
experts in their areas of knowledge. Professional  knowledge in the specific jobs 
was replaced rapidly by the party militancy. It was in Albania where you could 
find a bank governor or a minister of finance from any profession, except for 
economist. 
 The banking system, one of the most powerful institutions of the market 
economy, despite some small progressive steps, was left too far behind. Its 
incompetence caused the banks to lack credibility in the view of the Albanian 
businessmen and their money transactions instead of going through banks, 
passed in suitcases of cash from one businessman to another when doing 
business. In this way, the businessmen risked their business and their life at the 
same time. On the other hand, the banking system was supportive not only of the 
honest and competitive businesses, but also of the pseudo businesses, too. On 
behalf of their “businesses”, many people got credit from banks and used them 
for other purposes. A part of them, tempted by the high interest rate of the 
pyramid schemes invested there the money they got for business from banks 
with the hope that without working they would have the chance to profit much 
more. It is thought that the inefficiency of the Albanian banks and the lack of 
private banks are some of the causes of the beginning of the Albanian crisis, 
which, as it may be known, started as a crisis of pyramid schemes. In such a 
ground, the pyramid schemes, where their existence was accelerated because of 
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lack of proper legal framework, became quickly “successful” offering the 
incentives to start a massive epidemic among people. Two of the worst things of 
the pyramid schemes were: 
First, “the robbery” of the savings of those working for years as refugees (and of 
their relatives) in Greece and Italy, and  
Second, the education of the people with the motto that capitalism is the system 
of many surprises like that of being rich without working and within a short 
period of time. What the individuals in capitalist countries achieve after working 
hard for many years, the Albanians would achieve through tasting, in two or 
three years time, the fruits of their “money coupons” issued by the pyramid 
schemes.  
The number of people that invested their money in these firms was very large. 
So their loss was transformed into an earthquake which gathered many things 
with it, while at a certain point (the people at the beginning were involved in 
economic protests) demanded even the resignation of the president and his party. 
All these protests happened in such a way that it will be remembered for a long 
time not only in Albania, but in the entire civilized world.   
If we expand this analysis further into the capital market, we can say without 
any doubt that it is still in the infantile phase. The beginning of this market 
officially in May 1996, is an example of a delay in its development. In this 
market, mainly the banks and some other institutions, which like banks are state 
owned, operate. In this market, only obligations of the state are traded, but 
private companies are still not quoted. While the state is playing with itself, this 
market keeps out of the game the private sector.  
 One of the great achievements, which was spoken also much about, was the 
freedom of thought and opposition of the specialists. But after a short time, it 
was clear that a thought and especially an economic thought different from those 
of the people with power began to be considered as anti reform, and as such, it 
should be left aside. Although with more space than before to express 
themselves and their ideas, the specialists found themselves within the frame 
decided from above, and the scientific debate for alternative solutions was 
replaced by conformism with what was approved from the top, from the new 
nomenclature.  
 Corruption was raised into a system and nothing could be imagined to be 
realized without paying something under the counter. The government declared 
with all the channels of its voice the war against this phenomenon, but the result 
was too much ado about nothing.  
 As far as the rights of the people and the image of Albania before 
international opinion led by American opinion are concerned, the situation 
continued to get worse and this was displayed openly after the election of May 
1996, in “Scanderbeg square”. The arena of the unequal “battle” of the 
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governmental heavy machine, against the demonstration of the opposition forces 
for not knowing the results of the violated elections, was a show of almost 
unbelievable efforts of a party trying desperately to stay in power in an 
antidemocratic manner. 
A brief history of the development of pyramid schemes in Albania 
The beginning of the informal market in Albania was in the years 1991-1992. 
With the wind of change in economic, political and social life, with the 
development of the economy, to find the necessary capital for starting a business 
was a priority. As a first step, it was the development of the informal line of 
credits from friends and relatives. This helped the creation of the initial capital 
so necessary for the birth of a business.    
Gradually, with the increase of income per capita, which is one of the necessary 
bases for the birth of pyramid schemes, in the period 1993-1994 there started to 
appear some phantom firms. Their activity was expanded by collecting incomes 
from small consumers, attracting them by offering interest rates higher than 
those of the bank offer. Meanwhile, their activity at that time was only locally 
focused. It has to be emphasized that the majority of these firms had also 
businesses like supermarkets, mines, livestock and agricultural activity, etc. 
These firms took the pyramid form mainly during the years 1995-1996. Any 
profit level secured in economic activity could not justify the very high interest 
rates applied by them. Also, the competition between them for creditors brought 
an increase in very high levels of interest rates (from 5-50 percent in a month). 
At this point, the population trusted these firms, because of the fact that for some 
years they were paying back normally and correctly both the interests and the 
money invested. 
The phenomenon of depositing money into these kinds of firms left its imprints 
on the banking system as well. At the beginning of 1996 the deposits of the 
population in the banks decreased drastically. Money was withdrawn from banks 
in order to be invested in such pyramid schemes. So, in total, bank deposits 
decreased by 100 percent.  
The first signal issued by the government in November 1996 was not accepted 
by Albanians, who have been attracted very much by the peak that the interest 
rates of the pyramid schemes have reached.  
Paradoxically, after the signals issued through state television, the flow of 
deposits increased even more. Some reasons for this paradox are:  
 The long time of the activity of the pyramid schemes. 
 The massive poverty and the desire to be rich within a short time. 
 The lack of knowledge about this phenomenon 
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 The identification of the activity of these firms with the government. 
At the end of 1996, the first pyramid scheme (“Sude”) went bankrupt. The 
people who had deposited their money there started demonstrations against the 
government accusing it of indifference and participation in the pyramid 
schemes. Finding it facing the people’s pressure, the government ordered 
administratively two foundations “Populli” and “Xhaferri” to be closed down. 
The government also undertook the difficult task of distributing to the depositors 
the money they had invested in these two foundations. Instead of calming down 
the situation, these actions mixed the government totally with the bankruptcy of 
pyramid schemes. 
The first months of 1997 brought with them a general unrest and the country 
was near catastrophe. The economy ceased its activity. Many businesses were 
destroyed. Prices increased by 50 percent. The Bank of Albania increased the 
amount of money in circulation by 45 percent within a period of six months. 
Meanwhile, the budget deficit by the end of November 1997 was 36.3 billion 
leks.  
The causes of the birth of pyramid schemes and the factors that helped 
them to a “long life”  
Pyramid schemes in Albania reached levels never noticed before in other 
countries. At the very beginning, their activity was not pure pyramid. At that 
time, we had an overlap of pyramid schemes and economic activity. But in many 
instances, people aimed at increasing their deposits because of serious housing 
problems. Due to lack of housing or bad living conditions, numerous families 
settled in the large cities, after selling their houses and invested the money in 
fund-raising schemes. 
On the other hand, the base of the income turnover grew very much. The high 
interest absorbed not only domestic capital, but the incomes of the refugees, too. 
Monthly interest provided the living means for many families, primarily retired 
pensioners. But it holds true even for others, who wanted to multiply their initial 
amounts which reached alluring figures that formed the basis upon which people 
calculated their earnings without giving due consideration to the sums retrieved. 
In many cases, the people had only “coupons” for their invested money, because 
in most cases they did not received their interest, but capitalized it. They 
imagined they possessed millions, while having only paper coupons. The 
psychology of interest re-depositing and capitalizing was aimed at obtaining 
better housing conditions or setting up new businesses and not simply surviving. 
Pyramid schemes were characterized by: 
 The multitude of forms in which they appeared in front of the depositors. 
From this perspective they can be grouped as follows: 
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 Charity foundations: “Populli” and “Xhaferri” were the biggest. 
 Investing companies like VEFA, Kamberi, Cenaj, Silva, etc. 
 Companies with no other activity but money collection like “Sude”. 
 Unlike other countries where these schemes operated in specific zones or 
regions, in Albania they spread all over the country. Very soon it became a 
national phenomenon and did not remain merely a local one as it proved to be in 
Eastern European countries. 
 The schemes developed in Albania stand out from the rest also for their 
duration. Political factors strongly intervened with economic factors, largely 
contributing to their longevity. It is estimated that the funds employed in the 
pyramid scheme amounted to approximately USD 1,2 billion, i.e. 60 percent of 
the Albanian 1996 GDP.  
Amongst the factors that encouraged such schemes, we shall mention the 
following: 
 Geographic position. This position is like a bridge that links East with West, 
Europe and Asia and for this reason Albania became very attractive for the 
speculators of drugs and guns, as well as for illegal emigrant businesses, etc. 
The southern environment, from a geographic point of view was very favorable 
for the birth of pyramid schemes. 
 The massive poverty. After the “Berlin Wall” was broken in Albania, too, the 
Albanian people were ready to undertake a high risk for narrowing the economic 
differences with western countries. In such conditions, this game took such 
tragic dimensions, that many people sold their houses- the only real estate they 
possessed- with the hope of winning much more. 
 The accumulation possibilities of the population. During the years 1994-
1996, when the informal market took on large dimensions, the economy of the 
country was growing significantly. The incomes of the people were increasing 
as a result of :  
o The growth of the GDP. (During the period 1994-1996, the savings of 
the population achieved a level of 15 percent of GDP, or nearly 350 
million $);  
o The incomes from emigration. The incomes from emigration in 1995 
were calculated to be about 250 million $, while in 1996 this figure was 
thought to be 500 million $ (an average 700-800 $ per emigrant in a year); 
o The incomes from aid and loans. After the events of 1991 and 
especially after March 1992, the neighbor countries, the European 
Community, the international financial institutions and other institutions 
have given to Albania aid and loans in relatively large amounts. A good 
part of this aid is used directly in favor of businesses, families, etc. But 
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the entrance of monetary flows accompanies them. The National Agency 
of Foreign Investments calculates that an average of 150 million $ each 
year have entered Albania from these sources.  
 The non-positive role played by the massmedia, which advertised the interest 
rates applied by these firms and at the same time did not announce the public 
opinion of the danger. 
 The reaction of international institutions like the International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank was with too much delay.  
 It is thought that in that “long life” of the pyramids the money that comes 
from abroad for money laundering in Albania has had a significant impact.  
 Lack of civil knowledge of the formal market. Over a period of 50 years, the 
structural elements of the formal market have not been in place; people had too 
little knowledge about business difficulties earning money; the situation was 
aggravated from the psychology prevailing in people’s mentality, which 
expected the government to protect its citizens from risk. Furthermore, the 
pyramid schemes’ bosses participated in official receptions and enjoyed the full 
support of all the media. Public perception, rooted in the difficult situation of 
Albania, that these companies were laundering money, reinforced the credibility 
of the returns they offered. 
 Lack of a legal framework and the absence of legal institutions. The analysis 
bears out the conclusion that the backward Albanian financial system passively 
contributed to such a phenomenon; banks were just entering their restructuring 
process; there were neither private banks, nor stock exchanges or a full legal 
framework that could prevent public fund raising by non-licensed operators. 
 This vacuum served as a fertile terrain for fund-raising company owners who 
still find supporters among senior officials who justify them by mixing up 
private borrowing with public savings. 
 As to the effect politics had on the economy, we all are aware that every 
political group was forced to undertake a structural reformation of the economy, 
which involved both political and social costs. That is why the problems were 
not nipped in the bud, but increased until it became impossible to resolve them 
in a second stage. The attempts made to  
Table 1: Growth in real GDP in Eastern Europe 
 Years 
Country 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996 
Esti-
mated 
1997 
Pro-
jectio
n 
Estimated 
level of real 
GDP in 
1996 
(1989=100) 
Projected 
level of real 
GDP in 
1997 
(1989=100) 
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Albania -10.0 -7.2 9.4 8.9 8.2 -15.0 85 73 
Bulgaria -9.1 -7.3 1.8 2.1 -10.9 -7.0 67 63 
Croatia -6.9 -11.1 0.6 1.7 4.2 5.0 70 74 
Czech R. -1.2 -3.3 2.7 5.9 4.1 1.0 89 90 
Estonia -8.1 -14.2 -1.8 4.3 4.0 7.0 71 76 
Macedonia -9.9 -21.1 -4.0 -1.4 1.1 2.0 55 56 
Hungary -3.5 -3.1 2.9 1.5 1.0 3.0 86 89 
Latvia 2.9 -34.9 0.6 -0.8 2.8 3.4 52 54 
Lithuania -5.0 -37.7 1.0 3.0 3.6 4.5 42 44 
Poland -11.6 2.6 5.2 7.0 6.0 5.5 104 110 
Romania -5.6 -8.7 3.9 7.1 4.1 -1.5 88 87 
Slovak Rep. -2.5 -6.5 4.9 6.8 6.9 4.5 90 94 
Slovenia -4.7 -5.5 5.3 4.1 3.1 4.0 95 99 
Source: Transition report 1997 EBRD, p. 115 
protect this activity constituted a political error and figures demonstrate a 
strong correlation between the evolution of the political events and 
deposit levels. Such was the case with the rise in deposits in 1996, 
especially after the May 1996 elections. 
The overcoming of the crisis and the further development of the 
country on the road to the transformation of the economy  
The important indicators of the economic growth for the whole period of 
transition of Albania and particularly the years 1997-1998, compared with other 
countries in transition, are shown in the table 1. 
According to data in this report, but also to our own calculation, it was foreseen 
that in 1997 the countries of Eastern Europe would achieve 95 percent of the 
GDP of the year 1989. Meanwhile, Albania achieved in 1996 only 85 percent of 
the 1989 GDP. For the year 1997, the forecast of the EBRD was not achieved, 
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and what is worse, according to EBRD calculations Albania would achieve only 
73 percent, because of the turbulent situation in the spring of 1997. It was only 
Poland, which during the year 1997 passed the level of GDP of the year 1989 by 
plus 10 percent. 
In the context of the Eastern and Baltic states, 8 out of 14 analyzed in the year 
1996 passed a growth rate of 4 and more percent, but three of them, Romania, 
Czech Republic and Albania had a very low or negative growth. The situation of 
Albania is explained by the events of spring 1997.  
If we take into consideration the inflation rate, (the data published by INSTAT) 
at the beginning of 1992 it was 237 percent, while with a very fast decline in the 
year 1996 it reached the level of 6 percent. According to the evaluation of 
EBRD, for 1996, the level of inflation was 17 percent. This report, as well, 
shows that the projected inflation for 1997 was 42 percent. Returning again to 
the data presented by EBRD, the economic growth foreseen for several countries 
in 1998 is shown in table 2.   
As can be seen from this table, the forecast for 13 countries is within the span 
from 1.9 percent to 8.9 percent. The lowest growth is foreseen in Romania, 
while the highest is in Albania.  
The figures of table 3 show that the growth of GDP in 1998 is estimated at 10 
percent. This indicates some good efforts in economic development. The other 
figures of this table indicate a modest improvement of main macroeconomic 
indicators in 1998.  
But what would be some of the ways for a fast recovery and steady development 
of the country?  
1-The necessity of a monetary policy in accordance with the fiscal policy of the 
state 
The difficult situation our country passed through during 1997 and after it in 
1998, sets the demand for a wide program of objectives and measurements for a 
coordination of monetary and fiscal policy.  
The achievement of final objectives towards macroeconomic stabilization 
requires from the Bank of Albania a tight monetary policy. But the 
implementation of such a policy may be unsuccessful if it is not coordinated 
with a tight fiscal policy as well, because we will have not a long-term 
stabilization if the starting point is only the emergency situation. 
Table 2: GDP growth forecast for Eastern Europe 
Countries  GDP growth forecast for 1998 (Average)
Albania 8.9 
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Bulgaria 2.2 
Croatia 5.2 
Czech R. 2.5 
Estonia 4.4 
Macedonia 5.1 
Hungary 4.0 
Latvia 4.6 
Lithuania 4.3 
Poland 5.0 
Romania 1.9 
Slovak Rep. 3.7 
Slovenia 4.3 
  
Table 3: Main macroeconomic indicators 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
The real growth of 
GDP in % -10 -28 -7.2 9.6 8.3 13.3 9.1 -7 10 
GDP per capita 
(thousands Leks) 5.1 3.7 3.5 3.9 4.2 4.6 5.0 4.3 5.1 
Consumer price 
index (CPI), in %  22.7 76.4 100 115.8 122.8 144.1 204.8 225.3
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Foreign exchange 
rate Lek/USD 
(Average period) 
  75 102.1 94.7 92.8 104.5 149.1 163.3
Budget revenues in 
% of GDP 46.8 31.5 24.7 26.7 24.1 23.5 18.5 17.3 22.1 
Budget 
expenditures in % 
of GDP 
62.1 62.2 46.2 40,4 33.1 32.3 28.8 29.5 35.8 
Total budget deficit 
in % of GDP 15.4 30.7 21.5 13.7 9 8.7 11.3 12.2 13.8 
Inflation in % 
  237 31 16 6 17 110 40 
Source: “Fiscal statistics of government”, Tirana, March 1998. 
2-The reduction of the informal sector  
The long-term development of Albanian business is closely linked with the 
reduction and elimination of the informal sector, too. (The informal sector is that 
part of economic activity that is realized partly or totally outside the influence 
and the authority of the law). An obvious influence in the development of this 
sector has derived from the main macroeconomic steps undertaken in the 
economy during these first years of transition. Here can be mentioned especially 
the steps linked with the giving up of the state intervention in the economy 
(deregulation), the liberalization of trade and prices and the creation of the legal 
and institutional conditions for competition.  
In different dimensions and indications, during these years of transition 
appeared many forms of hidden activities like smuggling, the production and 
marketing of drug plants, prostitution within the country and abroad, the 
informal credit market, the corruption of a part of the state employees, etc.   
As we showed before, the number of businesses increased relatively very fast, 
but this phenomenon was accompanied by a lot of problems. So, it was with the 
morality of taxation. To express it more clearly, the problem here is the attitude 
of the “players” of the informal economy (but, not only they) towards the legal 
obligation to pay taxes and social security to the state. The results of research 
carried out about two years ago showed that the majority of the people 
interviewed (nearly 90 percent of them) did not pay taxes. The rest admitted that 
they paid, implying here social security in the state enterprises and institutions 
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where they have their “first job”. This becomes clearer from some approximate 
calculation of the percentage of the payments for social security and taxes in the 
total incomes of the family. (For the people interviewed this percentage was 
very little, 6 percent of the incomes; from which 4 percent were from the 
incomes of the job they had in the state and only 2 percent from the incomes of 
self-employment)    
A high level of development characterizes the informal market in Albania. From 
this viewpoint, it can be said that it represents a source of development for 
economic recovery, but on the other hand, it is an obstacle for fast economic 
development. This sector is a strong reason for the decline of the state income 
from social security, because the unregistered incomes of private 
entrepreneurship represent a gross amount of incomes that are not paying their 
fiscal obligations. It has also reduced the level of wages, has hindered honest 
competition through private businesses and caused damage to the labor market- 
creating so a strata of undefended people.  One of the reasons for this situation, 
excluding the insufficient level of legal education of the entrepreneurs and the 
fact that the majority of them are at the same time owners and managers, is also 
the lack of sufficient experience of the fiscal administration body, the 
insufficient and nonfunctional control of state structures; as well as the presence 
in this administration of some people who consider their job as a good position 
to obtain extra incomes and favors.  
The reduction of the informal sector and its legalization among others requires a 
better harmonization of the interests of employees and employers, of 
entrepreneurs and the government. A major role is expected to be played by 
public education on the one hand and the expanding of local government 
competencies in the administration of fiscal incomes of business activity on the 
other hand.             
3-Business stimulation according to a long-term and differentiated strategy 
The number of businesses in the production sector is still far away from the 
opportunities and the demands of actual and future development. The 
stimulation of these kinds of businesses is a perspective that generates many 
jobs and increases the possibilities for leaving the crisis behind. From this point 
of view, we could say that many businessmen want to invest in this still 
somewhat virgin area, but the policy and the strategy of the development of the 
country has not played its stimulus role properly.  
The capital required to invest in production is generally large compared to trade 
and the service sector, but the policy of granting is still within its frozen 
framework. Up to now the priority is given to short-term credit with 
unsupportive interest rates for these kinds of businesses. It is well-known that 
the investment return for production lines and factories is longer and for this 
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reason long-term credit must take its place and with softer interest rates 
compared with other non-productive businesses.  
Business credit has been in an unsatisfactory level because of ineffective 
management of credits offered by Albanian banks. Very often, a non-stimulus 
credit is offered i.e. short-term credits with a high interest rate. The business is 
not treated in a differentiated way and according to a long-term strategy of 
country development. The short-term credit has prevailed over the long-term one 
(their ratio has been 1:2 in favor of short-term credit). Perhaps this kind of credit 
policy, biased toward the short-term has been influenced by the 
undercapitalization of banks and the lack of sufficient guarantees for a secure 
return of the credit offered to businesses. If we see this issue from the viewpoint 
of business management, we can say that several businesses have been in a 
privileged position because of individual preferences and not of merit and a 
policy of strategic country development. So a part of businesses taking 
advantages from the weak control of banks, too, “invested” in the pyramid 
schemes the credit they obtained from banks instead of using it for “nourishing 
and growing” their activity. Instead of profits through honest competition, those 
businesses were oriented in profiting in other ways, even without working. The 
worst thing of this phenomenon was not simply the deviation from profiting in 
rivalry with other competitors, but parasitism was stimulated creating the bad 
opinion that capitalism was easy and anybody can profit a lot even without 
sweating!  
On the other hand, following a protectionist policy for some kind of products 
and businesses would be stimulating for Albanian investors. Following up a 
more stimulating policy for domestic production could serve, too, as a support 
for a more effective management of economic deviation. This deviation actually 
means that nearly 13-15 percent of the work force lives abroad and more than 25 
percent of GDP comes from external (foreign) sources, the capital needed for 
infrastructure construction is from foreign sources and the demand is mainly 
oriented towards imported products. This deviation might have positive aspects 
as well. It might help the reduction of rural unemployment, accelerate 
development and modernization. But it could have in itself a risk, too. The first 
danger could be that which happened in Eastern Germany where increasing 
supply destroyed production capacities. This combined with emigration and 
liberalization caused non-repairable damages. The danger stands, too, in the fact 
that in Albania domestic demand does not stimulate local production and this 
country could be changed into an importer of ready made products. As a 
consequence, these would increase deficits and foreign debts. Another danger is 
the possibility of emigration as a result of the unemployment in the rural areas 
and of urban crises.  
With the aim of the development of SMEs and the overcoming of the obstacles 
and difficulties mentioned above, the role of the state with its supportive 
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policies, powerful business infrastructure and with more integrated mechanisms 
for solving local restrictions, the conditions and the culture are very important  
The start-up and the expansion of SMEs are an ongoing process, which require 
time. It is relatively simple to create a company, but it is very difficult to survive 
for a certain period of time. Some of the countries support the development of 
SMEs through a national strategy, while others do not have officially such a 
strategy, although elements of the policies on SMEs are part of the general 
economic policies. This happens particularly in those countries where this sector 
is about 90 percent of the whole economy. The result of these different choices 
is the setting up of institutions and the usage of different instruments for SMEs 
development.  
The support and development of SMEs are considered an important element of 
economic growth. In the conditions of Albania, this is particularly important. 
The Albanian State is conscious of the big role that it has to play in this process 
through putting together all the efforts and the necessary resources for 
facilitating and supporting private initiative. Drafting a contemporaneous policy 
of SMEs development as well as a development strategy, the Albanian state 
aims to increase the number of small and medium businesses, their contribution 
to the national economy and the stimulation of small and medium size 
production enterprises in the sectors with dynamic development. Also, it aims to 
set up the state mechanisms for supporting these kinds of enterprises from the 
start-up phase and their further development.  
To achieve these objectives, the state must intervene in three directions:  
 Financial, through creating a functional system which will guarantee the 
reimbursement of the credits taken; through using differentiated taxes according 
to the importance of the activity, as well as the perspective of development; 
through giving credits under favorable conditions for new businesses.  
 Organizational, through supporting the activities of consultancy and 
management training for the entrepreneurs; through eliminating the 
discrimination between the private and public sector; through encouraging 
incubator centers under favorable conditions for business and mainly for those 
businesses that propose stable development projects; through supporting 
wholesale firms as a fundamental condition for securing the supply of SMEs 
which have production activities.  
 Institutional, through improving the legal framework especially for SMEs, 
through securing its implementation; through creating and administrating an 
efficient information system with access for entrepreneurs; and lastly through 
creating a national system of consultancy and training centers for small and 
medium businesses.  
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Starting from these conditions, the Albanian State is aiming at supporting small 
business through drafting the development strategy for this sector. This strategy 
aims at:  
 Creating the conditions for increasing the number of SMEs and strengthening 
those in existence, 
 Increasing financial funds for SMEs with favorable conditions,  
 Creating all the facilities for the participation of Albanian entrepreneurs in 
training, 
 Consultancy, information in the area of management, marketing, standards of 
quality, business organization, organization of production with new technology 
as well as the increasing of productive capacities and the competition of SMEs 
in domestic and foreign markets, too. 
4- Free Economic Zones 
Albania desperately needs jobs that are more meaningful. The workers are 
skilled and their labor cost extremely low. Albania must attract foreign firms, 
which can take advantage of its cheap labor and national resources. These firms 
must be allowed to freely export their products to other countries, as an 
incentive for building their facilities in Albania. Otherwise, the Albanian 
domestic economy cannot afford them at present. This arrangement may be 
viewed by some critics as exploiting Albania, but importantly, it will create not 
only needed jobs for Albanian workers, but it will also lead to work experience, 
training, and know-how in modern companies. Concurrently, free economic 
zones will create pockets of badly needed industrial infrastructure – 
transportation, communications and utilities. 
5- A showcase in Tourism 
A particularly promising development area for Albania is tourism. In addition to 
its beautiful mountains and beaches, which are within three hours flying time of 
most major European cities, Albania has numerous historical attractions. 
6- Aggressive training of Young Professionals. 
The future of Albania rests on the shoulders of its young people. Many young 
people have, and still are trying to pursue, a better future by trying to leave 
Albania. However, giving a ray of hope to young professionals, quality 
education and training would seem to be extremely valuable. 
7- International integration of the Albanian Economy.  
Integration generates two welfare effects, trade creation and trade diversion. 
Trade diversion results from price competition that will divert trade from former 
trading partners in non-member countries. Trade creation occurs when cheaper 
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supplies may be obtained from member countries at the expense of domestic 
producers. 
The welfare effects of integration for Albania appear impressive. Trade creation 
will stimulate domestic production to satisfy higher priced foreign markets. 
Domestic production is so low that trade could hurt some current domestic 
producers. Albania stands primarily to benefit economically from economic 
integration – particularly with Western Europe – according to traditional 
comparative advantage theory. Trade diversion from current partners is unlikely 
to constitute significant costs because Albania’s two largest importers are Italy 
and Greece, countries which are keen to bolster Albania’s economic and 
political stability. Indeed, such public goods hold a high value in the wake of 
NATO bombing in March and April.  
The benefits of economically integrating Albania to the EU and other Western 
economies are intuitive and the potential for increasing trade links is apparent in 
theory and empirical evidence from other regions. However, Albania’s weak 
institutional environment still constitutes a significant obstacle to linking 
markets. Investments are simply not secure. Transparent, value-added 
production enterprises that generate regional and foreign exchange and 
contribute to economic growth have not emerged in Albania. Convoluted 
property rights and an ineffective judiciary render investments extremely risky. 
Integration with the EU also offers specific challenges as witnessed by Albania’s 
attempts to accede to the WTO. Accession may be frustrated by the European 
Union support of certain sectors, particularly agriculture. 
Albania’s European neighbors would benefit directly from enhanced trade and a 
larger market, but more importantly, they would benefit from the political 
stability brought on by a richer Albania. Albania would especially benefit, as it 
will substantially increase the level of wages and the rate of growth. 
The major obstacle is institutional reform. However, given the immense benefits 
proffered by integration, means must be explored to find mutually beneficial 
arrangements to innovating joint institutions to generate the surplus that creates 
value and improved relations.  
Despite the achievements and the predisposition of actual government, the 
success of fully overcoming the crisis as well as the continuation with 
confidence on the road of further democratic transformation in the economy and 
in the whole life of our society, will depend precisely on these three factors:   
First, the level of public confidence in the government and its reforms. 
Since the election of June 1997, the confidence of the public towards the 
government has shown signs of decline, which was reflected in the resignation 
of the government followed by another left-wing government. During this year 
many things happened; the European and American government together with 
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international institutions expressed their confidence in the government, but the 
process of reforms and above all the level of people’s well-being have not 
advanced, if not declined. And the indicator of well being is a resultant force 
that shows better than anything the level of confidence of the public towards its 
government.  
Second, full public order  
No improvement in the economic life and in the level of well being can be real if 
it is not accompanied by full public order. This is closely linked with the 
prosperity of the economy, with the high level of courage and initiative of the 
businessmen and in general of the domestic and foreign investors. Smuggling 
and other aspects of fiscal evasion are present despite the big efforts of the 
government. One thing should be emphasized here: things will not change much 
if the center that gives birth to such phenomena is not eliminated. It is too 
difficult to cut off the way of crime with legal means in a country where three 
quarters of the population live in poverty. Even states with strong democratic 
traditions and with a high level of law implementation would not be so 
successful if they did not fight with economic means that center that is the main 
cause of crime: poverty. So, the number of unemployed people in the economy 
is more than 245 thousands. On the other hand, the minimal wage for a state 
employee is no more than 28 percent of the calculated life minimum level, while 
the average wage is only 41.5 percent of this life “minimum”. If this analysis is 
continued with the comparison of the wages in some countries in transition, we 
see that in these countries (table 4) the average wage is from 2-6.5 times higher 
than that of Albania.  
Third, a fair political game according to European standards  
To characterize this ridiculous war between Albanian politicians in the poorest 
country in Europe, one Albanian author has said that we can compare Albania 
with a ship in danger of sinking, while the crew (the politicians) is divided into 
two parts fighting who will be the master of the ship. It seems that their fight 
probably will be finished before the winner is declared, because a ship waiting 
for a captain will not survive for a long time. Have the politicians understood 
that they are fighting a battle without winners at a time when they must work 
together to save the ship from sinking and then, too, must work together to 
reconstruct the ship to sail safely into the “democratic sea”?  
Table 4: Comparison of wages in some countries in transition  
Countries  Monthly wage in $ Growth in percentage 
(Albania  100 %) 
Poland 329 658 
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Czech Rep. 
Slovakia 
Hungary 
Russia  
Bulgaria 
Romania 
Belarus 
Ukraine 
Albania 
316 
256 
246 
185 
126 
100 
95 
55 
50 
632 
512 
492 
370 
252 
200 
190 
110 
100 
Source: Albanian Observer NR 7-8. 1997, Tirana, p 22 
Many people in Albania think that this generation of politicians should be 
changed with politicians of a young generation. It is better to have inexperienced 
politicians who make mistakes from lack of experience but unconsciously, than 
politicians with an old spirit who dream only of their seats and themselves at the 
top of the state. The new government composed by some new politicians, ex-
students of December 1990 who took part in the movement that brought about 
the overthrow of communism, are a hope, but it is very difficult for Albanians to 
believe them. Another new politician as a Prime Minister replaced this 
government after a year. But let us wait with the hope that something will 
change in this country and that the people will have a better future- that which it 
deserved a long time ago. 
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Cultural Transformation at Enterprise Level: Case Study 
Evidence from Poland* 
Izabela Robinson, Beata Tomczak-Stepien** 
This paper presents an analysis of the business cultures of four post-socialist 
Polish enterprises. Western capitalist orthodoxy emphasises the development 
and management of an ‘appropriate’ organisational culture as a key component 
of organisational effectiveness. Within an East European context it is likewise 
suggested that the development of appropriate market behaviours is necessary if 
transforming economies are not to hit a ceiling of recovery. However, what 
constitutes an ‘appropriate’ organisational culture within an East European 
context is open to speculation and debate, particularly if it accepted that there is 
no dominant model of capitalist work organisation which might represent a 
template for transforming economies. This paper draws on empirical case study 
material to appraise the business cultures of four post-socialist Polish 
enterprises. Findings suggest that ownership, turnover of human capital and 
management philosophy and ideology represent key factors in the development 
of market oriented behaviours. However, findings also reinforce the strength 
and endurance of the socialist culture. 
In dieser Arbeit wird die Analyse der Unternehmenskultur von vier polnischen 
Unternehmen der post-sozialistischen Ära vorgestellt. Was unter einer 
‚angemessenen’ Organisationskultur im Osteuropäischen Kontext zu verstehen 
ist, darüber kann spekuliert und debattiert werden, besonders dann, wenn kein 
Standardmodell kapitalistischer Arbeitsorganisation für sich wandelnde 
Ökonomien existiert. Die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden empirischen Studie legen 
die Vermutung nahe, daß Eigentum, Humankapital, Managementphilosophie 
und Ideologie Schlüsselfaktoren bei der Herausbildung marktorientierten 
Verhaltens darstellen. Andererseits bestätigt sich die nachhaltige Wirksamkeit 
der sozialistischen Kultur. 
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Introduction 
Within western capitalist societies, the development and management of 
organisational culture is seen as a key component of organisational effectiveness 
(Denison, 1984, Barney 1986, Williams et al 1993). Similarly, within an East 
European context it is suggested that successful transformation to free market 
capitalism requires (in addition to institutional and structural reform) the 
‘unfreezing’ of a dysfunctional socialist culture and the embedding of 
entrepreneurial attitudes and behaviours (EBRD1997) 
However, the concept of organisational culture remains problematic and there 
are wide-ranging and unresolved debates as to the meaning of organisational 
culture and the extent to which organisational culture may be successfully 
manipulated and changed. Moreover, economic and political transformation in 
post-socialist Central Eastern Europe (CEE) has specific characteristics and 
features which distinguish it from western restructuring initiatives. The concept 
of path dependence (Stark 1992) suggests that individual CEE economies will 
follow different paths to a free market economy which reflect their specific 
historical, social and cultural legacies. Furthermore, as Whitley (1995, p11) 
suggests, the corresponding lack of any dominant model of capitalist work 
organisation which might represent a template for transforming economies 
reinforces the likelihood that institutional, socio-technical and attitudinal change 
will be contingency constrained. However, the concept of path dependence 
needs grounding empirically if it is to provide a meaningful basis for 
understanding the differential nature of the transformation process in CEE. Path 
dependence can operate at enterprise level as well as nationally and it is the 
nature and complexity of transformation at enterprise level that this paper aims 
to inform. Accordingly, the following structure is adopted: firstly we draw upon 
existing literature to conceptualise organisational culture and to identify relevant 
issues in the management and implementation of cultural change. Secondly, we 
consider literature in relation to the characteristics of organisational culture 
within Polish socialist firms Thirdly, we present and discuss empirical data in 
relation to cultural transformation within four post-socialist Polish enterprises 
and identify significant factors in the adjustment to free market conditions. 
Conceptualising organisational culture and the process of culture 
change 
Western capitalist orthodoxy emphasises the development and management of 
organisational culture as a key component of organisational effectiveness. The 
‘excellence’ literature, (Kanter 1989, Peters 1987, Peters / Waterman 1982) 
together with studies of Japanese corporations, (Ouchi 1981, Pascale / Athos 
1981) highlighted organisational culture as a key factor in the achievement of 
competitive business advantage. The emergence of the concept of Human 
Resource Management (HRM) as an approach to managing the employment 
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relationship, has likewise served to emphasise the development of a 
management ideology and set of practices aimed at creating an appropriate (or 
changing an inappropriate) organisational culture. HRM policies and practices in 
areas such as recruitment and selection, socialisation, development, promotion 
and reward represent mechanisms for translating dominant organisational values 
into action in a way that supports the business strategy (Keenoy / Anthony 
1992). 
However, the concept of organisational culture remains problematic and there 
are wide-ranging and unresolved debates as to what organisational culture is (see 
e.g. Frost et al 1991) and the extent to which an organisational culture can be 
managed and changed. Mabey et al (1998) point to a polarised treatment of 
organisational culture identifying at one extreme a consultancy-based, 
prescriptive treatment (Willmott 1993, Williams et al 1994) which has an 
instinctive appeal to managers, particularly those within an individualistic, 
Anglo-Saxon culture with a bias for action and  fascination with business leaders 
(Lundy / Cowling 1996). At the other extreme are located more theoretical, 
analytical approaches which illustrate the shortcomings of managerialist 
prescription. For example as Legge (1995) suggests, a ‘ 
positivistic/structural/functionalist’ perspective which conceptualises 
organisational culture as something the organisation ‘has’ results in a view of 
organisational culture as ‘somehow unitary and the collective conscience of the 
organisation’, (Legge 1995, p186), whereas an alternative view of culture as the 
product of social interaction, or as something the organisation ‘is’, emphasises 
the essentially pluralist nature of organisations, (Legge 1995, p185).  
This polarised treatment of organisational culture,  reflecting differing 
epistemological standpoints, likewise extends to debates as to the extent  to 
which organisational culture may be manipulated and changed. Viewed from a 
pluralist perspective, it is questionable whether organisational culture may be 
successfully  changed (Legge 1995, Ogbonna 1996). Group dynamics processes 
may be effective in changing attitudes and behaviour and Schein (1987) sees 
behavioural change as a precursor of cultural change. However, Ogbonna (1996) 
questions the degree to which employees readily replace existing values with 
new ones and suggests that employees may learn to adopt the language and 
behaviour of a new cultural paradigm without fundamentally altering their 
beliefs and values. Furthermore, the achievement of permanent or deep-rooted 
change through the use of behavioural change strategies may in itself pose an 
obstacle to future change. 
Pragmatic approaches to changing culture (e.g. through changing job roles, 
reward strategies and styles of management) on the basis that these will result in 
culture change likewise equate behavioural change to culture change (or the 
assumption that behavioural change will result in culture change) and reinforce 
epistemological questions about the conceptualisation of culture. As Legge 
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suggests, it is a structuralist/functionalist approach which emphasises the role of 
the leader in developing an appropriate collective consensus and suggests a 
‘…culture created by senior management for the lower orders to follow’, (Legge 
1995,p186). An alternative view of culture as an outcome of social interaction 
casts doubts over the degree or even the feasibility of senior management’s 
ability to unilaterally change organisational culture. As Legge points out, ‘If the 
corporate culture makes no sense of the organisational realities experienced by 
the employees other than senior management, it will not become internalised 
outside that small sub-group’, (Legge 1995, p187). A managerial view of culture 
change serves to explain why much vaunted culture change programmes have 
been less than successful in winning the hearts and minds of employees within 
western capitalist organisations, (Lundy / Cowling 1996, p169). The failure of 
TQM and BPR programmes likewise bear testimony to the mistaken assumption 
that enterprise culture (in both western and eastern enterprises) can be 
transformed as quickly and as easily as other organisational assets and resources. 
(See e.g. Schaffer / Thompson 1992, pp80-89) 
Within the transforming economies of CEE it would be naïve, therefore, to 
assume that organisational culture change would be any less straightforward and 
unproblematic than within western capitalist organisations. Case studies of 
strategic change in Polish enterprises emphasise leadership as a key factor in 
responding to new markets, (Lempkowski 1992, Kozminski 1995), while other 
commentators point to structural change, management turnover and the removal 
of senior managers associated with the past regime as key factors in enterprise 
restructuring and improved enterprise performance (EBRD 1997, Obloj / 
Thomas 1998). However, many of the pre-1989 elites, power structures and 
vested interests remain within enterprises and it would be simplistic to 
underestimate the strength and pervasiveness of the socialist culture. It is to a 
consideration of the Polish context and the characteristics of state socialism that 
we now turn. 
Characteristics of organisational culture within Polish socialist 
enterprises 
It has been suggested that the socialist system resulted in a degree of uniformity 
which militated against the formation of distinct organisational cultures 
(Czarniawska 1986, p313). This uniformity stemmed from a homogeneity of 
organisational structures at enterprise level which in turn reflected the economic 
and political structures of the socialist planning system. 
Polish socialist enterprises operated within a hierarchically administered system 
(union of enterprises, ministries and the Planning Committee), subject to the 
influence and interference of external power centres (the Communist party and 
the bureaucratic hierarchy), (Otta 1996, Kostera / Wicha 1996). Thus vertical 
authority structures were undermined by external agencies with the result that 
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management roles, responsibilities and levels of accountability were blurred. 
Management attention was focused on the supply side of the value chain. 
Enterprises were not required to sell their output or to finance their production 
or investment; this was the role of central agencies. However, managers had to 
ensure they received sufficient supplies of raw materials (including labour) to 
ensure plan fulfilment. Here two skills were particularly important; getting soft 
targets which could be easily achieved and stockpiling resources (including 
labour) to meet tight deadlines, (Peiperl / Estrin 1998) – both depended on 
connections within the administrative hierarchy, the authorities, the party and 
the secret police (See Kostera / Proppe / Szatkowski 1995) for the nature of the 
‘bargaining’ role of Polish enterprise managers and the development of 
reciprocal networks). Kostera and Wicha (1996) describe the environment of 
Polish socialist enterprises as one of ‘cultural schizophrenia’ where economic 
considerations were subjugated to political rationality as the dominant logic. 
This resulted in ‘introversion’ in economic terms characterised by an aversion to 
risk and innovation and unwillingness to take responsibility for economic 
decisions alongside ‘extraversion’ within the political arena manifested by close 
relationships with communist party members and political interest groups.  The 
results were economically damaging - there were few incentives for efficient 
performance and the short-term orientation worked against risk-taking, 
innovation and accountability – but they likewise impacted on employee 
behaviour and work relationships. 
Labour relations within Polish socialist firms were likewise shaped by the 
features of central planning. The combined effects of an illusory shortage of 
labour, low levels of labour mobility, the socialist ideology of each worker’s 
right to work and basic survival guaranteed by  minimum monetary and 
supplementary social wage, contributed to what Thirkell et al (1997, p19) have 
described as an ‘apparently indulgent style of labour relations’ whereby  
supervisors tolerated poor quality work and low levels of labour discipline in 
return for worker support and flexibility in meeting plan targets and coping with 
shortages of supplies. Lax labour relations were reinforced by  a lack of 
differentiation of work roles between supervisors and workers and close 
informal working relationships and were further exacerbated by the repressive 
political climate of socialist enterprises (Staniszkas 1979). In the absence of a 
specific workers’ culture or organisation  or the opportunity for protracted 
lasting action (as opposed to periods of labour unrest and militancy), Kramer 
(1995, p78) suggests that Polish workers sensed their limited capability to 
challenge decision-making at enterprise level and instead used ‘…their 
lacklustre job performance as a means of ‘exit’ from the system’. Such 
sentiments also support Soulsby and Clark’s (1995, p99) conclusion that ‘…one 
of the few freedoms of a worker was the ‘right’ not to work hard’. Not working 
hard could be considered patriotic because it represented a protest against the 
socialist system. 
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Within this context of worker ‘voice’ (or lack of),  it is appropriate to consider 
the concept of the state-dependent worker as a normative type of personality 
created by state socialism. The concept of state-dependent workers relates to the 
relationship of the worker to the state and to specific work habits and behaviours 
developed under state socialism which might be said to contribute to an 
attitudinal and relational legacy which conditions the attitudes of workers and 
impacts the process of transformation (Miszkala 1996, Staniszkas 1979, 
Kolarska-Bobinska 1994). To develop the first point; the socialist system of 
bureaucratic redistribution guaranteed job availability, job security, price 
stability and a largely egalitarian incomes policy. In doing so it minimised 
individual risk, generated apathy and passivity of behaviour, promoted attitudes 
of dependency and created a state of ‘learned helplessness’ (Miszalska 1996, 
p47) combined with a distrust of the authorities. This state of psychological 
resignation manifested itself at the workplace in a ‘low-productivity-anti-
individualist’ mentality (Miszalska 1996, p47), low levels of accountability and 
initiative, the suppression of difference and interest representation and a low 
work ethic. 
The dismantling of the socialist system and the process of transformation from a 
centrally planned economy to free market capitalism has had an enormous 
impact on the functioning of enterprises but the endurance of the socialist 
culture and an ‘old cultural mind frame’ (Kostera / Wicha, 1996) is seen as 
inhibiting effective restructuring and transformation to free market conditions 
and undermining the effects of technological change. Within this context the 
concept of organisational culture presents a potentially useful means by which to 
identify enduring patterns of behaviour from the socialist past but also in 
demonstrating changed behaviours and their drivers. 
Research design 
The aim of this paper was to explore the business cultures of four post-socialist 
Polish enterprises through the perceptions of those involved in organisational 
change and transformation. We noted earlier the epistemological difficulties 
inherent in the  conceptualisation of organisational culture (whether this 
represents behaviour, or values and take-for-granted assumptions) and the 
consequent lack of a convincing conceptual model that demonstrates how 
cultural change may be successfully undertaken. We are also mindful of the 
dangers inherent in a monolithic approach to organisational culture where 
typologies of culture suggest the imposition of a specific category on an 
organisation (Handy 1986). We have therefore adopted a process approach, 
building on the work of Schein (1984), which views organisational culture as a 
dynamic process and which takes account of the perceptions of participants in 
the process of culture formation, management and change. 
Schein (1984, p3) defines organisational culture as: 
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‘…a pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered or 
developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration, and that have worked well enough to be considered valid 
and, therefore, to be taught to those new members s the correct way to perceive, 
think and feel in relation to those problems’. 
Schein’s definition recognises that organisations face two fundamental demands 
– that of external adaptation and internal integration, both of which have 
particular resonance within transforming economies. External adaptation, Schein 
suggests, comprises five elements; strategy, goals, means, performance measures 
and correction systems while internal integration demands shared meanings, 
definition of organisational boundaries and the legitimisation of power. Schein’s 
definition likewise suggests that culture embraces the concept of morality in 
determining what is right and appropriate in advocating acceptable behaviours 
and thus underscores the ethical dimension of culture change and manipulation. 
Furthermore, he acknowledges that any group within an organisation has the 
potential for developing its own sub-culture, particularly if it enjoys stability of 
membership and has a history of joint problem resolution.  
We take the view that organisational culture is socially constructed; that it 
represents both the experience of past actions and acts as a conditioning element 
of future actions. Thus organisational culture is influenced by the environment 
and socio-technical systems of the enterprise which are in turn influenced by the 
values and beliefs of the groups and individuals making up the enterprise. 
Viewing organisational culture both as an input and as an output suggests that it 
is likely to be self-perpetuating and resistant to change. A process view of 
organisational culture demonstrates the challenge facing socialist enterprises in 
adjusting to free market capitalism and highlights limitations of neo-classical 
economic orthodoxy which emphasises privatisation, enterprise re-structuring 
and introduction of hard budget constraints as principal mechanism for the 
operation of a free market. Organisational transformation is more complex that 
such analyses suggest. 
The research design adopted a case study approach which incorporated 
participant observation, analysis of company documents, interviews with 
enterprise directors and senior managers and a survey questionnaire to assess 
worker perceptions of the prevailing organisational culture together with their 
perceptions of how this has changed and their aspirations for future change. 
Fifteen interviews were carried out across the four enterprises with enterprise 
directors and senior managers. The interview protocol focused on the use of 
open questions (with prompts on specific issues), hypothetical questions and 
unpacking critical incidents in order to obtain different perspectives on different 
issues. A qualitative approach was felt to be more sensitive to processes in terms 
of how changes had taken place but nevertheless allowed for an holistic view 
rather than a narrow focus on component elements. In designing questionnaire 
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items we were concerned with incorporating features identified within the 
literature as characteristic of the culture of socialist enterprises. Thus questions 
focused on worker perceptions of levels of individualism, collectivism and 
egalitarianism at work, management styles and authority structures. Table 1 
summarises the sample size and response rates. 
Table 1: Sample size and response rates 
Enterprise No. Employed Sample Response 
A 480 48 (10%) 43 (89%) 
B 450 98 (22%) 98 (100%) 
C 1,700 170 (10%) 155 (67%) 
D 480 48 (10%) 26 (54%) 
The questionnaire required workers to indicate their perceptions of ‘how things 
were, are and should be’ in relation to a number of items. In this way we were 
able to construct a model of worker views of their preferred organisational 
culture. Given the emphasis in the literature of the difficulties of rapid culture 
change we were also able to identify prevailing features of the socialist culture. 
The study focused on four post-socialist Polish enterprises which were at 
different stages in the transformation process. We were concerned with 
evaluating the purpose and effectiveness of programmes aimed at enabling 
enterprises to adjust and compete within free market conditions and specifically 
we were interested in the techniques employed to change organisational culture 
to match the perceived requirements of the organisational environment. The 
enterprises within the study were differentiated by size (number of employees), 
by product and technology used (although all enterprises were within the 
manufacturing sector), location and nature of ownership. All enterprises shared 
similar origins as state-owned enterprises and all were concerned with finding a 
foreign strategic investment partner from the same industry. Two of the 
enterprises within the study had strategic investors whilst two were still in the 
process of trying to attract one. Table 2 provides brief details of study 
enterprises. 
Discussion of findings 
The enterprises within the study were at different stages in the transformation 
from socialist central planning to free market capitalism. Enterprise A was in a 
very difficult economic situation. In 1989 the enterprise employed 1,200 people 
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and this had reduced to 480 but the enterprise was still making losses largely 
because a substantial part of its production (over 50%) was geared towards  
Table 2: Enterprise Characteristics 
Enterprise Size Product Ownership Characteristics of Transformation 
5th NIF 33 % 
State Treasury 27 % 
Other NIFs 23 % 
A 400 
Manufacture 
oil tankers 
& trailers 
Employees 17 % 
Contraction of operations 
(workforce reduction from 
1,200 by natural wastage) 
sale of machines, land, 
buildings 
outsourcing of transport, 
maintenance 
B 450 
Manufacture 
transmission 
stations and 
valves for 
gas industry 
100% ownership by PGNiG 
(state owned) 
Defensive: 
partial rationalisation of 
operations (closure of 
foundry, outsourcing) 
moves towards greater 
regulation & 
standardization 
JV – Pioneer 
Treasury 33 % 
Pioneer  11 % 
Employees 20 % 
C 1700 
Manufacture 
loud 
speakers 
Bank & Life 
Ass. Comp. 1 % 
Defensive 
Re-structuring of 
production process, 
introduction of new, 
automated assembly line 
ISO 9000 
Search for foreign ‘know-
how’ 
JV 
Danish Co. 70 % 
Treasury 18 % 
D 480 
Manufacture 
integrated 
systems for 
gas & water 
supply 
Employees 2 
Heavy investment by 
parent in production 
technology, computer 
systems, management & 
staff training 
ISO 9000 Quality circles 
50% staff t/o since 1991 
New functions - sales, 
marketing, 
military production and repair and there had been no substitution for this loss of 
production. Since 1989 the enterprise had been fighting to survive  through a 
variety of cost-cutting and restructuring measures. The restructuring process, 
which had been largely financed internally and which had required enormous 
effort on the part of the workforce had  been of limited effectiveness. Worker 
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frustrations and disillusionment with the restructuring process were evident in 
questionnaire responses (see Table 3) which indicated that workers felt that 
things were better five years ago than currently. For this enterprise a strategic 
investor represented the only way out of its economic crisis but despite 
widespread recognition of this situation, there were considerable fears about the 
implications for job security and remuneration particularly amongst 
administrative staff. Many skilled and competent production workers had left the 
enterprise and secured employment elsewhere but administrative staff were 
particularly vulnerable. 
Enterprise B also did not have a strategic investor but here the situation was 
slightly different because the enterprise was part of a much larger company, 
PGNiG which dealt with gas extraction and distribution. The gas industry was 
regarded as of strategic importance to the economy and the parent company thus 
enjoyed the protection of a strong entry barrier. This protection did not extend to 
Enterprise B who produce transmission stations and valves and who are subject 
to competition, but nevertheless, the parent company has sheltered the enterprise 
from the exigencies of the market and had provided funding for restructuring 
initiatives such as modernising machinery, the introduction of computerised 
systems and large-scale training programmes. The enterprise began looking for a 
strategic investor two years ago; the driver was awareness of growing 
competition within this industrial sector coupled with the need for a 
technologically and economically sound partner to support the enterprise’s 
diverse activities. Through a process of elimination, the enterprise began to co-
operate with a German concern as a pre-requisite for acquisition. The nature of 
this co-operation involved exchange visits by managers and workers and a 
sharing of information and know-how.  
In relation to worker attitudes there was a similar apprehension on the part of 
administrative workers to organisational restructuring but the key opponents of 
the acquisition process were the trades unions who feared substantial job losses 
particularly as small scale job losses had already been experienced as part of the 
restructuring process. A large proportion of the workforce, particularly older 
workers believed that the enterprise was in a strong enough position to survive 
and prosper independently within a free market which represented an optimistic 
scenario. Within the remaining two enterprises there was evidence of co-
operation of Polish workers and managers with foreign owners and partners. 
This is not to say that the initial stages of working with a foreign investor were 
free from conflict and tension and that Polish managers and workers had to 
adjust to new ways of working and managing. Strategies for co-operation varied 
in their nature and scope.  
Enterprise C was a large monopolistic enterprise employing 1,700 people in the 
production of loudspeakers and was one of the first enterprises privatised by 
public sale of share on the Polish stock exchange following a joint venture with 
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a Japanese investor. The Japanese investor had incrementally increased  
financial shareholding and involvement in business decision-making but this 
was not reflected in a clear strategic direction for the enterprise. The Japanese 
investor had concentrated on the education and training of employees on new 
production lines and in emphasising quality and continuous improvement issues. 
They saw their role as bottom-up socialisation of the workforce in Japanese 
styles of working whilst difficult economic decisions about the functioning of 
the enterprise (e.g. decisions about job losses) were left to the Polish 
management team. 
By contrast to the Japanese approach, Enterprise D had adopted a clearly defined 
strategic vision and direction based on developing market share and exploiting 
the advantages of low cost production. Enterprise D manufactured integrated 
systems for the supply of gas a water to utility companies and entered into a 
joint venture agreement with a Danish investor in 1991. The Danish partner had 
invested heavily in a widespread programme of technological change and the 
development of a distribution network backed up by large scale training and 
development programmes. Entry barriers in this market were low but the 
enterprise competed on the basis of providing an integrated technology with 
comprehensive pre and post-sales service which gave it a competitive advantage 
and the company has enjoyed rapid expansion of the Polish and East European 
markets. The workforce numbered 480 and was predominantly young, qualified 
and relatively highly paid. Within Enterprise D the workforce were enthusiastic 
and supportive of the joint venture agreement largely because of the personal 
style and interpersonal skills of the enterprise director who was instrumental in 
selling the advantages of foreign partnership to the workforce. During the period 
of the joint venture there had been no reduction in staffing levels and the 
workforces had actually grown by 30% through the recruitment of young, 
qualified people into newly created positions within finance, sales and marketing 
functions. Initial enthusiasm for the joint venture had been sustained throughout 
the eight year period of foreign investment and workers at all levels were very 
positive about their role within the enterprise. 
Table 3 presents questionnaire extracts which reflect worker perceptions of 
aspects of organisational culture and how this has changed within enterprises 
studied. Responses also indicate worker aspirations for the future. 
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Table 3: Extracts from questionnaire showing worker perceptions of how things 
were, are and should be. 
Enterprise A 
People co-operate to 
solve problems 
People are 
responsible for 
results 
People are able to 
make decisions in 
their work 
Question 
5 yrs ago now 5 yrs 
ago 
now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
To no/small degree 42% 66% 28% 47% 9% 70% 76% 18% 
To adequate degree 16% 16% 35% 20% - 19% 9% 9% 
To great degree 42% 18% 37% 33% 91% 11% 15% 73% 
Question 
 
People are free to 
exercise individual 
initiative 
People build close 
working 
relationships 
People have to abide 
by rules & 
regulations 
 5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
To no/small degree 42% 44% 7% 49% 63% 7% 12% 26% 14% 
To adequate degree 33% 28% 2% 21% 16% 7% 18% 19% 14% 
To great degree 25% 28% 91% 30% 21% 86% 60% 55% 72% 
People take 
responsibility for 
their own 
development 
People take 
responsibility for 
colleagues’ 
development 
There is a strong link 
between performance 
& work 
Question 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
To no/small degree 42% 42% 7% 67% 75% 24% 77% 90% 9% 
To adequate degree 21% 23% 9% 19% 12% 16% 16% 2% - 
To great degree 37% 35% 84% 14% 13% 60% 7% 8% 91% 
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Enterprise B 
People co-operate to 
solve problems 
People are 
responsible for 
results 
People are able to 
make decisions in 
their work 
Question 
5 yrs ago now 5 yrs 
ago 
now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
To no/small degree 23% 10% 31% 11% 1% 61% 19% 4% 
To adequate degree 40% 38% 42% 30% 3% 28% 34% 9% 
To great degree 37% 52% 27% 59% 96% 11% 47% 87% 
Question 
 
People are free to 
exercise individual 
initiative 
People build close 
working 
relationships 
People have to abide 
by rules & 
regulations 
 5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
To no/small degree 46% 5% 1% 31% 14% - 24% 5% - 
To adequate degree 33% 30% 6% 39% 34% 2% 42% 21% 8% 
To great degree 21% 65% 93% 30% 52% 98% 34% 74% 92% 
People take 
responsibility for 
their own 
development 
People take 
responsibility for 
colleagues’ 
development 
There is a strong link 
between performance 
& work 
Question 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
To no/small degree 38% 4% - 55% 22% 6% 55% 42% 4% 
To adequate degree 42% 32% 11% 29% 37% 15% 30% 29% 4% 
To great degree 20% 64% 89% 16% 41% 79% 15% 29% 92% 
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Enterprise C 
People co-operate to 
solve problems 
People are 
responsible for 
results 
People are able to 
make decisions in 
their work 
Question 
5 yrs ago Now 5 yrs 
ago 
now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
To no/small degree 26% 31% 25% 18% 4% 61% 48% 13% 
To adequate degree 35% 31% 39% 21% 6% 26% 31% 23% 
To great degree 39% 38% 44% 35% 90% 13% 21% 64% 
Question 
 
People are free to 
exercise individual 
initiative 
People build close 
working 
relationships 
People have to abide 
by rules & 
regulations 
 5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
To no/small degree 18% 18% 8% 30% 31% 6% 14% 8% 5% 
To adequate degree 43% 36% 6% 36% 32% 5% 15% 8% 7% 
To great degree 39% 46% 86% 34% 37% 89% 71% 84% 88% 
People take 
responsibility for 
their own 
development 
People take 
responsibility for 
colleagues’ 
development 
There is a strong link 
between performance 
& work 
Question 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
To no/small degree 30% 20% 5% 51% 53% 20% 63% 54% 11% 
To adequate degree 34% 34% 16% 33% 31% 29% 18% 21% 5% 
To great degree 36% 46% 79% 16% 16% 51% 19% 25% 84% 
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Enterprise D 
People co-operate to 
solve problems 
People are 
responsible for 
results 
People are able to 
make decisions in 
their work 
Question 
5 yrs ago now 5 yrs 
ago 
now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
To no/small degree 43% - 19% - - 62% 10% - 
To adequate degree 24% 48% 38% 24% 10% 38% 38% 10% 
To great degree 34% 52% 43% 76% 90% - 52% 90% 
Question 
 
People are free to 
exercise individual 
initiative 
People build close 
working 
relationships 
People have to abide 
by rules & 
regulations 
 5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
To no/small degree 29% - - 34% 19% - 29% - - 
To adequate degree 33% 24% 5% 29% 19% 5% 24% 14% 10% 
To great degree 38% 76% 95% 37% 62% 95% 48% 86% 90% 
People take 
responsibility for 
their own 
development 
People take 
responsibility for 
colleagues’ 
development 
There is a strong link 
between performance 
& work 
Question 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
5 yrs 
ago 
Now should 
be 
To no/small degree 38% 5% - 66% 24% 15% 57% 19% - 
To adequate degree 33% 33% 10% 24% 66% 33% 19% 24% 5% 
To great degree 29% 62% 90% 10% 10% 52% 24% 57% 95% 
It is possible to conceptualise the transformation process from a socialist culture 
to a market led, entrepreneurial culture as a continuum with the ultimate goal of 
what EBRD (1997) describe as ‘deep restructuring’. Viewed in this way the 
enterprises within the study can be viewed as occupying different positions 
along this continuum. We have identified key factors impacting on this 
progression and driving culture change as ownership (in particular foreign 
ownership), management style and ideology and strategies for performance and 
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reward management. These factors are not mutually exclusive but rather 
reinforce each other in the development of a new cultural paradigm.  
Ownership as a factor in cultural change 
The enterprises within the study were at different stages in the transition from a 
socialist to a market led culture. At one extreme Enterprise A faced an uncertain 
and insecure future particularly if NIF support was not forthcoming. This 
uncertainty was evident in worker questionnaire responses where replies on all 
items suggested a perception that things were worse now than they had been five 
years ago. In particular workers felt that levels of accountability, co-operation 
and teamworking had deteriorated. Workers at Enterprise A also reported the 
widest discrepancy in their perceptions of the present and their aspirations for 
the future, particularly in relation to the recognition and reward of individual 
performance and responsibility at work. At the other extreme, Enterprise D 
represented an example of a commercially successful and prospering enterprise 
which had undergone a radical transformation in all aspects of its operation and, 
of  all the study enterprises, could be said to approximate to an entrepreneurial, 
market driven organisational culture. A key factor in this transformation had 
been the role of FDI and know-how with practically all innovations (production 
technology, logistic systems, integrated computer information systems, 
managerial techniques and processes) having been brought in from the parent 
company. Such innovations underpinned by strategies for recruitment, 
development and reward had been influential in hastening successful adjustment 
to a market economy. 
Enterprises B and C had made some ‘defensive’ adjustment measures in 
response to competitive market pressures and a hardening of budget constraints. 
Enterprise B were planning a rationalisation of operations through the 
outsourcing of ancillary activities, while Enterprise C were anticipating a 
restructuring of production processes through the introduction of new, 
automated assembly lines. Managers within both of these enterprises saw 
restructuring as an expansion of operations to exploit the profit potential of the 
enterprise as the appropriate response to competitive market pressures (as 
opposed to a contraction of operations as at Enterprise A). However, neither 
enterprise had made any significant attempts at ‘deep’ organisational 
restructuring. Functional hierarchies remained in place and there had been 
limited initiatives to change working methods or to improve existing resources. 
Worker perceptions highlighted improvements  in opportunities for individual 
development and teamworking but also indicated wide discrepancies between 
existing arrangements and worker aspirations particularly in relation to the 
development of effective working relationships, levels of responsibility and 
accountability and involvement in decision-making. 
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Management styles and ideology 
We found little evidence within the enterprises studied of a rational, strategic, 
management driven approach to culture change. Within Enterprise D, the 
impetus for a clearly defined vision of the future was provided by the foreign 
parent company and was underpinned by a strategic business planning and 
budgeting process implemented by appropriately trained and qualified 
personnel. Within the remaining enterprises, managers demonstrated a lack of 
clarity of organisational goals and strategic direction. They had an incomplete 
picture of business strategy, strategic management or how to address employee 
expectations as expressed through questionnaire responses. Through interviews 
with senior managers we detected that Polish managers had enthusiastically 
adopted the rhetoric and vocabulary of western management (regardless of the 
degree of foreign involvement) but that this has had a largely symbolic value in 
enabling them to re-define their role and legitimising their authority within free 
market conditions. The following quotation is illustrative of how western 
management rhetoric has enabled Polish managers to nail their colours to the 
mast of free market capitalism: 
‘I consider myself to be a young man in my outlook although I am 45 years old. 
I am now working in the ‘second’ company, as this is the best way to describe it. 
Previously the enterprise was a state monopolist, customers were an 
afterthought; for western managers this would be inconceivable. I had the good 
fortune to study western organisational structures and systems at university and 
wrote my thesis on this subject. I took every opportunity to visit England. I tired, 
but was unable to apply the practical principles here because of the inertia of the 
state enterprise system. Now (following his appointment as Enterprise Director 
in 1994), I am able to influence the organisation and apply the principles of a 
healthy organisation’. (Enterprise Director, Enterprise A). 
However, to see the adoption by Polish managers of the rhetoric of western 
managers as evidence of any real change in management roles and behaviour is 
superficial and premature. As suggested earlier, managers had an unclear and 
incomplete picture of business strategy and lacked confidence in their own 
ability and expertise to implement change which manifested itself in the 
tendency to seek outside help and know-how through seeking strategic foreign 
investors and the use of academics and consultants. Whilst privatisation  may 
have removed the political and economic straightjacket of socialism, insider 
control within enterprises, has meant that the informal networks and reciprocal 
arrangements characteristic of the management of state owned enterprises have 
been largely preserved. 
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Management strategy for the development of human resources. 
Despite the differences between enterprises outlined earlier, workers across all 
enterprises demonstrated a large degree of consistency in respect of their 
perceptions of ‘how things should be’ and the characteristics of their preferred 
organisational culture. Particularly significant were issues in relation to people 
being free to exercise initiative at work, taking responsibility for their own 
development, building close working relationships and linking individual 
performance to rewards. Worker preferences indicated support for a strong 
culture which was individualist rather than collectivist in character. In addition, 
workers saw the need for clear rules, policies and procedures governing their 
role at work and their responsibilities, and emphasised the social role of the 
enterprise in meeting welfare needs. In one sense this can be seen as feature of 
the socialist legacy which provided extensive social protection but is also a 
feature of the employment policies of foreign organisations although in the latter 
case protection is dependent on performance. In contrast with the collectivist 
provision of social protection within socialist firms, such provision by foreign 
firms is used as a motivational tool and for many Polish workers represents an 
attractive approach. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Polish workers respond 
very positively to the activities of foreign enterprises such as foreign trips, 
parties and social events.  
In order to probe worker aspirations we asked additional questions in relation to 
what workers felt would make them more effective in their jobs and again we 
found a high level of consistency in responses across all four enterprises. 84% 
highlighted ‘better resources to work with’;75%  having clearer goals and 
targets to work to; 74%  better understanding of how their work was evaluated; 
72%  better understanding of the organisation’s purpose and mission; 71%  
greater freedom to use individual initiative and judgement at work. Whilst 
caution needs to be exercised in relation to the interpretation of such aspirations 
of the workforces within the enterprises studied, our findings do seem to reflect 
a reaction to the uniformity of a socialist culture together with a desire by 
individuals across all enterprises to have a greater degree of involvement and 
influence over their work and a greater level of responsibility. To this extent 
findings indicate a preparedness for change on the part of the workforce.  
However, despite formal institutional arrangements for employee representation 
and the existence of trade unions within all of the enterprises studied we found 
little evidence of a collaborative, ‘social partnership’ approach or any desire by 
managers to engage workers in the process of organisational transformation. As 
a senior manager at Enterprise C commented, ‘ as a good capitalist, I see no role 
for the trade unions in the process (of organisational transformation)’. Enterprise 
D, through the use of quality circles, direct forms of communication and 
increased delegation could be said to be moving in the direction of a more 
participative management style. However, within the remaining enterprises the 
Cultural Transformation at Enterprise Level: Case Study Evidence from Poland 
JEEMS 2/2000 148  
management style remained largely authoritative and there was no evidence to 
support a management ideology that saw human resources as a source of 
competitive advantage. Nevertheless, we found no evidence that employees 
were frightened of, or intimidated by their managers, but rather that both 
workers and managers were disempowered by the need to follow established 
rules and procedures, although paradoxically, there was widespread agreement 
that such regulations were necessary and appropriate. Within Enterprise B the 
emphasis in responding to competitive market pressures was to increase the use 
of management regulation and measurement. In this context bureaucratic rules 
and procedures represented less an effective form of management control as an 
opportunity to maintain the status quo and as a rationalisation for mistakes and 
inaction. 
Strategies for performance and reward management 
Reward and remuneration arrangements for workers under the socialist regime 
were very flat and undifferentiated. Within the enterprises studied, only 
enterprise D had used the leverage of higher wages and performance based pay. 
Although pay rates remained considerably lower than within the parent 
company’s operations in western Europe, wages within Enterprise D were 
relatively high for the locality and twice the national average. With the 
exception of Enterprise D, there was no evidence within the reaming enterprises 
of any serious control or motivation systems in place which resulted in a 
continuation of a somewhat laissez faire approach to discipline and the 
management of the employment relationship. Such a situation mirrored the 
socialist past and reflected a lack of managerial expertise and experience in 
creating effective internal performance management arrangements. However, it 
also reflected wider social attitudes and values. It was suggested to us that Polish 
people do not differentiate between their work and private lives; that employees 
know each other as friends and neighbours  within the same community and 
consider it inappropriate to make judgements and possibly reprimand friends. 
Conclusion 
Within the enterprises studied, Enterprise D demonstrated the most persuasive 
evidence of deep organisational restructuring and cultural adaptation to free 
market conditions. This was achieved through foreign intervention and 
investment and underpinned by extensive training and development 
programmes. However,  
 rapid organisational change within this enterprise took place not only because 
of changes in institutional processes but because both parties were willing to 
adapt and to co-operate with each other. This lends support to the view of a 
‘third way’ or an adjustment to changed market conditions which reflects neither 
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a complete emulation nor rejection of foreign approaches but the possibility and 
value of a joint approach which takes account of the particular circumstances of 
the enterprise. Such an approach reflects the value of a ‘path dependency’ 
approach to the study of transforming enterprises. Within the remaining three 
enterprises studied it was difficult to point to any large degree of cultural change 
or adjustment. Privatisation may have removed the political and economic 
straightjacket within which socialist enterprises had to operate and thus given 
enterprises a greater degree of autonomy but existing structures, hierarchies, 
relationships and ways of working remained largely unchanged. We conclude 
therefore that the speed and consistency of the direction of cultural change and 
adaptation is more pronounced in situations where there are strong external 
influences in the form of  foreign investment and involvement, clarity of 
organisational goals and strategic direction and an acceptance of the need to 
change.  
Despite difference between the enterprises studied, there was a high degree of 
consistency in worker perceptions of the characteristics of a market oriented 
enterprise. These characteristics were felt to include a transformational element 
in leadership style, a more individualistic employment relationship which 
included a link between individual performance and reward, higher levels of 
worker involvement in decision-making and improved levels of cross functional 
co-operation and teamworking. Changing organisational culture is a lengthy and 
complex process but our findings indicate that this process  may be hastened 
through the creation and articulation of clear organisational goals and the 
direction of their achievement, improved communication throughout the 
organisation and increasing worker accountability through improved training 
and development programmes and transparent systems  of performance review 
and reward. Given the characteristics of the socialist legacy, a  key factor in the 
successful implementation of the identified strategy is the constant 
reinforcement of strategic goals and the behaviours required to achieve these in 
order for these to be internalised by workers. 
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The article describes a study, which tries to identify the degree to which 
information technology is used strategically in Slovene small firms. Slovenia is 
interesting from small business perspective, because from 1990, when the 
transformation of its economy started, the number of small business has 
increased almost 6 times (from almost 6,500 to nearly 35,000 in 1998). In the 
paper the research model, hypothesis, methods and the research sample are 
explained, together with the results and discussion. 
In dieser Arbeit wird eine Studie ausgewertet, welche das Ausmaß der 
strategischen Verwendung von Informationstechnologien in kleinen 
slowenischen Unternehmen thematisiert. Slowenien ist insofern interessant aus 
der Perspektive der kleinen Unternehmen, als sich dort seit 1990, dem Jahr, in 
dem die Transformation der Ökonomie einsetzte, die Zahl der kleinen 
Unternehmen beinahe versechsfacht hat (von fast 6500 auf beinahe 35000 im 
Jahr 1998). Im vorliegenden Artikel wird das Forschungsmodell, die 
Hypothesen, Methoden und Beispiele genauso thematisiert wie die 
Forschungsergebnisse und ihre Implikationen. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 General background 
Most information systems texts and a large volume of popular and scholarly 
literature suggest that information technology (IT) is playing an increasingly 
critical role in the design and implementation of organisational strategy. IT has 
been described as facilitating the competitiveness, organisational transformation, 
increasing market share, and heightening customer service because it provides 
information and serves as a communication channel among various participants 
in such a way that may alter the basis for industrial competition (Bhide 1994), 
(Peppard 1993), (Porter/ Miller 1985). 
Indeed, case studies support the idea that IT helps firms in developing and 
implementing strategy, and that it yields direct economic benefit (Baura et al. 
1995), (Taylor/ Todd 1995). Year after year, increasingly affordable computers 
and other IT tools are produced to assist in the design and evaluation of strategy 
(Bergeron et al. 1998). 
If this is the case, why then do surveys in small and medium size enterprises 
suggest that two-thirds of the firms or fewer do not use IT strategically (Taylor/ 
Todd 1995), (Lesjak 1993). Apparently, it is more common for firms to design 
and implement strategy without the aid of the IT applications they have, and 
instead, to relegate IT to perform routine internal operations (Moreton 1995), 
(Langley/ Traux 1994).  
The purpose of this study is to identify the degree to which IT is used 
strategically in Slovene small firms, and to investigate the possible reasons and 
consequences for patterns of usage. As small firms struggle for positions of 
leadership in their respective industries, IT offers a possible advantage for the 
growing Slovene small firms. The question is: Is it being leveraged to that end? 
1.2 Slovenia’s Economic Transformation 
Although small, Slovenia leads many Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
transitional economies in economic growth and productivity. Slovenia’s small 
firms have played an important role in this transition. By transforming its 
economy Slovenia has established a fertile basis for small business growth and 
development. The number of Slovene small firms has increased six fold since 
1990, when the transformation of Slovenia’s economy began. In 1998, 35,205 
small firms represented almost 94% of all companies (1,478 midsize and 869 
large companies).(Ministry of Small… 1999) 
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Figure 1: Number of Small Firms in Slovenia 
If we compare the percentage of small businesses in Slovenia to that in the USA 
and European Union we come across similar patterns. But if we compare the 
portion of total employment in small business in Slovenia to that in the USA and 
Europe, there is a rather big difference. For example, in the USA, small business 
represents 97% of all businesses and 57% of the employment, in Europe: 98% 
(in 1997 98.92%) of all business and 46% of employment (Heikkila et al. 1991). 
Although there is a fair amount of variability in the employment share of small 
firms in Western Europe (ranging from Spain’s high of 81.1% down to 
Belgium’s low of 56.2% (Kagar/ Blumenthal 1994)—they are considerably 
higher than Slovenia’s 24% (Rue/ Ibrahim 1995). The sectors represented by 
small firms differ as well. For example, although only 10% of Western Europe’s 
new small firms have been in the area of manufacturing and construction, these 
sectors constitute 42% of new small firms in Slovenia (Chamber of 
Commerce… 1998).  
Structural differences between Slovenia’s small firms sectors and those of 
Western Europe, as well as year-to-year indicators, suggest that transition is still 
taking place among Slovene small firms. 
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2. Information Technology and Strategy 
2.1 Defining Strategic IT applications 
A strategic IT usage is the use of information and IT which can help develop, 
define and redefine, test, and, in some cases, implement strategy and develop a 
given product or specific business function or activity within which IT usage has 
a strategic impact. As such, we are interested in the role that IT can play in: 
 supporting the on-going evolution of strategy on the one hand and  
 enhancing firm’s competitiveness and co-operation on the other hand. 
The line between strategic and non-strategic applications is a fine one. Academic 
researchers typically differentiate between strategy and implementation, 
although directors and CEOs may make this distinction much less often 
(Gopinath/ Hoffman 1995). Additionally, it is sometimes difficult to identify 
whether a given IT application is strategic or not. Wiseman (1994), for example, 
suggests that strategic IT is largely determined by each firm’s environment, its 
basis for competition, and strategy. Using IT to closely monitor inventory levels 
might be strategic in a firm, which competes on the basis of low costs, but not in 
a firm, which competes through innovation. Thus, particular IT use has to be 
paired with firm strategy to identify whether the usage is strategic or not. 
The impact of various IT applications, however, may help differentiate strategic 
IT usage. Moreton (1995) emphasises three outcomes from IT applications as 
strategic: IT is strategic when it enhances an organisation’s ability to change and 
respond to environmental shift; facilitates movements toward various strategic 
outcomes such as customer satisfaction, streamlined business processes, and 
decentralisation, and when it reduces the mundane aspects of jobs, allowing a 
reorganisation of work, which encourages more learning and innovation. Each 
of these impacts suggest that strategic IT applications are not stand-alone 
functions, but well integrated with strategy, people, and operations 
(Blennerhassett/ Galvin 1993). 
2.2 Gaps Between Strategy, Practice, and Effectiveness 
There is a sizeable body of literature examining IT diffusion (Moore/ Benbasat 
1991), the growth of IT in firms (Covin et al. 1994), and the increasing 
proficiency (literacy) of IT users (Rainer/ Harrison 1995). None of this 
addresses the strategic use of IT, however, which is where much of the theoretic 
potency in IT applications lies. 
A number of reasons can be suggested as the reason, why IT might or might not 
be used strategically in a firm. OECD (1989) concludes that information system 
fails, when it is not implemented with the users and organisational setting in 
mind at the time of implementation. Parker and Swatman (1995), highlight 
several reasons why this may be the case: 
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 The lack of awareness of IT capabilities, 
 The time required to become acquainted with IT products and capabilities, 
 The lack of vision regarding IT's cost savings (or revenue enhancement), 
 The general absence of strategic perspectives in some SMEs. 
Although there is evidence on both sides, some research has shown that attempts 
to manage strategically yielded few advantages in firm performance. Slight but 
not substantial association between comprehensive historical financial 
reporting/use of financial ratio analysis and the rate of growth/firm performance 
has been reported (Thomas/ Evanson 1987), (McMahon/ Davies 1994). There's 
no significant difference between formal and informal planning in terms of 
problems which arise in the planning process or in the achievement of planning 
goals in a sample of US small banks (Kagar/ Blumenthal 1994). Others have 
found that formal planning makes a difference (Lussire 1995). 
2.3 “Defining” Strategic IT Usage 
Based on existing literature, a theoretical model and accompanying hypotheses 
can be generated regarding possible influences on the strategic IT usage in small 
firms (see Figure 2). Previous studies suggest that there are at least two 
influences, which may impact the degree to which IT is used strategically:  
 firm characteristics and  
 firm strategy.  
Figure 2: Model of Strategic IT Usage 
Firms’ 
characteristics 
   Firms’ strategy 
          
  Firms’ IT usage    
      
  Impacts of IT usage    
      
  Economic outcomes    
Some latest research (Bergeron et al. 1998) hasn’t confirmed our presumption 
that a firm’s environment as well has as an important influence on strategic IT 
usage.  
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Firms’ characteristics. Previous research indicates that small firms do not as 
much or as formal strategic planning as do large firms (Bhide 1994), (Rue/ 
Ibrahim 1995). This may be due to the fact that small firm employees tend to be 
generalists rather than specialist (Matthews/ Scott 1995), or because small firms 
are not always growth-oriented and often have a variety of goals, which impact 
the desirability of planning (Bhide 1994). As firms become older, they tend to 
grow in size. Thus, we see the firm's size and age, as being positively associated 
with strategic IT usage. We hypothesise that: 
H1: The older the firm, the more frequently IT applications will be strategic. 
Strategy. Research consistently shows that entrepreneurs and managers of 
SMEs vary in the competitive strategies they employ (Covin et al. 1994), 
(Kagar/ Blumenthal 1994). The choice of strategy is influenced in part by the 
degree to which the firm is oriented towards growth, and the degree to which 
SME managers are aggressively pro-active and entrepreneurial rather than 
reactive. The specific strategy employed will give priority to certain IT 
applications over others (Wiseman 1994) (sales IT applications, where customer 
service is important; purchasing IT applications, where resources are shared 
across divisions, etc.). 
H2: Firms will tend to use IT strategically, where applications match the core 
elements of their strategies. 
IT Usage. There is some evidence that the more IT is spread across various 
business areas or functions and the more it is involved in different areas, the 
more familiar employees and management will become with possible IT 
applications, and the more likely they will use IT strategically. Thus, we 
hypothesise that: 
H3: The breadth of IT usage across various business areas will positively 
correlate with strategic IT applications. 
Impacts of IT usage. The impacts of IT usage will be classified into strategic and 
non-strategic ones, due to their contribution to enhancement of firm’s 
competitiveness and co-operation. Impacts of IT usage will be matched with 
particular strategy types and again combinations of impacts will become our 
dependant variables.  
Economic outcomes. Additionally, we ask respondents to indicate how 
important a set of financial measures is in their firm and the degrees of 
satisfaction with firm performance on these outcomes. We also ask respondents 
to evaluate their relative standing on financial outcomes when compared to their 
competitors. We will try to find relations between the strategic IT usage and 
firms’ economic outputs. 
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3. Methods 
3.1 Measures/Variables 
Strategy. Strategy was measured in two ways taken from: Covin et al. (1994) 
and Kim and Choi (1995). 
IT Usage. IT strategic usage was measured in two ways: With a 6-item measure 
of IT applications within functional area are used by Cragg and King (1993); 
and, with a 3-item measure of the overall role of IT by Grover (1993).  
Impacts of IT Usage. This was measured by 16-item measure designed for the 
present study. 
Economic Outcomes. This was measured by 11-item measure which involve 
traditional economic criteria such as sales, revenue, profit, ROI, etc. 
3.2 Research Sample 
In this study, the criteria for defining a small business were adopted from the 
Agency for Payment System of Slovenia (1998). A small business is one that 
satisfied at least two of the following points. It has: 
 50 or fewer employees 
 fixed assets should be of 500.000 Euro or less, and 
 annual sales of 1 million Euro or less. 
In our sample we employed two additional criteria. We selected firms with: 
 an annual revenue of more than 100.000 Euro to exclude firms which 
probably cannot afford IT, and 
 10 or more employees to exclude micro firms. 
The names and the addresses of small businesses that fulfil the above criteria 
were obtained from the state Agency for Payment System (APS) of Slovenia. 
Non-profit organisations, publicly owned businesses, and wholly-owned 
subsidiaries of large businesses were excluded from the survey sample, leaving a 
sample of 974 businesses or 2.84% of all small firms in Slovenia. 
3.3 Procedures 
The study was conducted in Slovenia in two phases: A pilot study and the 
questionnaire survey. A pilot version of the “Small Business IT Usage 
Questionnaire” was compiled in Slovene and pre-tested with MBA students. 
Additionally, students taking a small business management course pre-tested  
Table 1: Characteristics of the Sample 
Characteristic Choices Frequency Percent 
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Sector Manufacturing 
Trade 
Business Services 
Construction 
68 
42 
26 
11 
46.3 
28.6 
17.6 
7.5 
Years in business >7 years 
<7 
25 
122 
17.0 
83.0 
Operating at a profit or loss Profit 
Breakeven 
Loss 
127 
1 
19 
86.4 
.7 
12.9 
Number of full-time equivalent 
employees 
10-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51- 
80 
22 
16 
13 
16 
54.8 
15.1 
10.9 
8.9 
10.3 
Profit-loss/employees -5,000 
5,001-10,000 
10,001-20,000 
20,001-30,000 
30,001- 
17 
43 
49 
21 
17 
11.6 
29.2 
33.3 
14.3 
11.6 
Computer usage in the firm >8 years 
6-7 
4-5 
<3 
44 
27 
43 
33 
29.9 
18.4 
29.3 
22.4 
Employees, who are IT users 86%-100% 
41%-85% 
11%-40% 
0%-10% 
40 
33 
38 
36 
27.2 
22.4 
25.9 
24.5 
Employees, who are responsible for 
IT 
15%-100% 
6%-14% 
1%-5% 
0% 
35 
35 
46 
31 
23.8 
23.8 
31.3 
21.1 
the questionnaire on 10 small businesses randomly chosen from the small 
business database. Based on feedback from both sources, the questionnaire was 
refined or the next phase of the study. (Responses from these pilot study 
businesses were not included in the final sample). 
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In the questionnaire survey phase, the questionnaire was mailed to the 974 small 
businesses in the survey sample. The questionnaire was completed by the person 
who is most closely responsible for IS within the firm. In small businesses that is 
usually the top manager or the owner. Quantitative data on the organisational 
characteristics (e.g. business sector, number of employees, annual sales, 
profit/loss, etc.) of the small businesses were obtained from the APS of 
Slovenia. All businesses are requested annually to file a report with the APS. 
Of the sent surveys, 161 were returned, giving a response rate of 16.5%. 
Responses from 14 businesses were discarded because they had incomplete data, 
resulting in a final sample of 147 usable questionnaires. 
To insure that the respondents were similar in characteristics to the population, 
these final 147 firms were compared to the 974 in terms of the number of 
employees, income, and income per employee (Data on all firms were obtained 
from the APS.). T-tests showed no significant differences on any of these 
measures (income: t = 0.65; p = .52; employees: t = 0.30; p = .76; income per 
employee: t = 0.72; p = .47). 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Sample 
Table 1 presents the sample characteristics. The responding small businesses are 
from manufacturing, trade (e.g., import-export), business services (e.g., 
consulting), and construction sectors.  
On average, small businesses in the sample had 29.3 employees and mean 
annual sales per employee of 101,922 Euro. The average firm had 5.8 years of 
computer experience, and about 50% of their employees computer literate.  
4.2 Instrument Validation (Assessing Reliability) 
For each composite variable, the reliability (internal consistency) was assessed 
by calculating Cronbach’s alpha coefficient as suggested in (Carmines/ Zeller 
1981). Table 2 also presents the results of reliability testing.  
The reliability coefficients were higher than 0.7 except strategy-low cost (alpha 
= 0.67), suggesting that the research variables are satisfactorily reliable 
(Nunnally 1978). The item-total correlation coefficients of items of research  
Table 2: Reliability and Factor Analysis of Variables (aCronbach Alpha 
(Standard), vVariance explained) 
Items Item-total 
correlation 
Factor 
loading 
Differentiation Strategy: .72a 55.0%v 
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Emphasizing product and/or service 
quality  
Investing in research and development   
Emphasizing education and training of 
employees  
Developing new products or services 
.43 
.68 
.48 
.48 
.67 
.86 
.72 
.70 
Low Cost Strategy: .67a 50.9%v 
Being a low-cost producer 
Automating functions as much as possible
Maximising efficiency of business 
activities 
Maintaining very low-level inventories 
.37 
.60 
.44 
.35 
.62 
.87 
.76 
.57 
Firm IT Usage:  .75a 37.3%v 
Research and development 
Purchasing/Procurement 
Production 
Marketing and Sales 
Inventory (warehousing)  
Transport 
Personnel/Humane Resources 
Finance and Accounting 
.43 
.58 
.62 
.35 
.38 
.50 
.56 
.27 
.61 
.72 
.76 
.50 
.55 
.65 
.63 
.39 
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Table 2 continued 
Impact of IT Usage:  .91a 52.2%v 
The quality of products and/or services 
Quality of producing products/services 
Finding new business opportunities 
Finding new markets 
Business process redesign 
Firm’s capabilities to adjust to changes 
Introducing new products and/or services 
Introducing new production and business 
technology  
Customer satisfaction 
Employee satisfaction  
Business risk 
.68 
.64 
.65 
.64 
.67 
.75 
.68 
.71 
.62 
.57 
.56 
.75 
.71 
.72 
.71 
.74 
.81 
.75 
.77 
.69 
.64 
.63 
Financial performance: .91a 54.6%v 
Annual sales 
Annual sales growth 
Revenue 
Revenue growth 
Profit 
Profit growth 
Profitability 
Return on investment (ROI) 
Solvency 
Ability to fund business growth from 
profits  
Overall firm performance 
.47 
.64 
.66 
.73 
.74 
.80 
.76 
.71 
.58 
.52 
.73 
.56 
.71 
.73 
.78 
.82 
.86 
.82 
.78 
.62 
.57 
.77 
variables were also high, indicating reasonable reliability of the research 
variables. 
To assess whether the item of the variables constituted different scales of 
variables, a principal component factor analysis was performed (Carmines/ 
Zeller 1981). Table 2 indicates that almost all the factor loadings are greater than 
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the recommended cut-off point of 0.5 (except the item Finance and Accounting 
in the Firm IT Usage column: 0.39) and all the items loaded on their 
hypothesised factors (Nunnally 1978). Hence, we are confident that construct 
validity was not violated. These results also provided confidence to combine 
various items under different variables into one construct. Since we weren’t 
satisfied with the percent of the explained variance of the first component for the 
research variable “Firm IT usage” (37.3%) and factor analysis revealed more 
than one underlying dimension for a construct, the factor was further examined. 
An eigenvalue of 0.9 or above was used as a criterion to estimate the number of 
factors underlying the construct. Because the construct had 3 interpretable 
dimensions (which altogether explain 66.6% of the variance), reliability was 
computed for each dimension. (Table 3).  
Table 3: Total variance explained for the variable “Firm IT usage” 
 Initial Eigenvalues 
Components Total Percent of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
Percent 
C1 2.98 37.29 37.29 
C2 1.41 17.58 54.88 
C3 .94 11.71 66.59 
… … … … 
For the first 3 components we performed Principle Component Analysis to 
identify any related forms of IT usage (Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
rotation method). Table 4 shows that components represent different industries:  
 C1 represents manufacturing firms because research/development and 
production functions have high coefficients, 
 C2 represents trade, because marketing/sales and transportation functions 
have high coefficients, and 
 C3 represents business services because personnel/human resources and 
finance/accounting have high coefficients in the contrast with 
marketing/sales. 
To realise the influence among the introduced measures/components of strategic 
IT usage, (i.e., introduced components for the following variables: Firm 
Strategy, Firm IT Usage, Impact of IT Usage, and Financial Performance), 
Pearson correlations was used. The results are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 4:Rotated Component Matrix 
Firm IT Usage:  Manufacturing Trade Business 
service 
Research and development 
Purchasing/Procurement 
Production 
Marketing and Sales 
Inventory (warehousing)  
Transport 
Personnel/Human Resources 
Finance and Accounting 
.92 
.35 
.72 
.20 
.28 
 
 
.35 
.32 
.85 
.80 
.11 
 
 
.29 
-.10 
.21 
.22 
.81 
.85 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics and Significant Correlations 
Variable 
Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Differentiation 
strategy 5.28 1.07        
2. Low cost 
strategy 5.49 1.02 .39**       
3. IT usage in 
manufacturing 4.78 1.63  .18*      
4. IT usage in  
trade 5.28 1.45  .36**      
5. IT usage in 
business services 5.13 1.69        
6. Impact of IT 
usage 5.12 .87 .26** .24** .28** .30** .37**   
7. Financial 
Performance 5.00 .79 .31** .23*  .19*  .18*  
**p > .01 (2-tailed), *p > .05 (2-tailed) 
Table 5 shows the following interesting significant correlations: 
 Low cost strategy correlates with the IT usage among manufacturing and 
especially trade firms, what is actually not surprising. Unfortunately there 
is no significant correlation among firms following differentiation strategy 
(such as business services firms) and IT usage. 
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 Both strategies correlates with the financial performance of the firms, but 
the questions is whether the IT usage and impacts of IT usage make any 
contribution to that performance? 
 IT usage in firms from all 3 industries significantly correlates with the 
impacts of IT usage, what is somehow anticipated, because if a firm uses 
IT heavily, than impacts of that kind of usage are expected. 
 Interestingly, there is a significant correlation only among impacts of IT 
usage and the financial performance of the firms from trade industry. 
 Interestingly again, there exist a weak but significant correlation between 
impacts of IT usage and financial performance of firms. So, we could say 
that there is a certain influence of IT usage on financial performance of 
firm. 
5. Conclusion 
Overall, general idea that IT is used strategically: 
 if IT applications support business strategy  
 in terms of IT usage across various business areas 
 what should have a certain positive impacts of IT usage on firms and 
 what altogether should reflect in financial performance of firms 
was at least partially supported by the research.  
The results suggest that Slovene small firms indeed are using some applications 
of IT strategically. Especially manufacturing and trade firms which are 
following low costs strategy. That is proved not only by various impacts of IT 
usage on firms but as well as by positive influence of IT usage and its impacts 
on firms’ financial performance. 
Weaknesses of the present study include the following: We assumed that the 
common utilisation of IT applications in economic sectors was an indicator of 
areas of strategic importance. There may be some multicollinearity present 
between the variables, however. Additionally, environmental variables might be 
tested in further research, as might the reasons why small firms’ 
managers/owners do and don’t utilise IT strategically. 
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Appendix 
Information Technology Usage in Small Slovene Firms 
An International University Research Questionnaire 
1. Rank first 3 industries in which you earned your revenue in last period (3 years) : 
Comment: The reason why I named industries is because I know the research group of firms! 
 manufacturing  
 trade 
 real estate, bus, activities 
 construction 
 elect. gas and water ... 
 transport, storage and 
communication 
 hotels and restaurants 
 
 health and social work 
 other comm. ... activities 
 other:_____________ 
2. What parts of your revenues come from sales: (in %; sum is 100%) 
 __% in SLO __% in ex YU countries  __% in EU __% other: _____________ 
3. How important are the following factors for your firm’s business (circle one number on each 
row): 
         absolutely                  not 
         critical                      important 
Making my product or service unique    7     6     5     4     3     2     1   
Excelling in customer service           7     6     5     4     3     2     1   
Focusing on a narrow, well-defined customer group     7     6     5     4     3     2     1   
Being a low-price competitor           7     6     5     4     3     2     1   
Being a low-cost producer           7     6     5     4     3     2     1   
Emphasizing product and/or service quality      7     6     5     4     3     2     1   
Automating functions as much as possible      7     6     5     4     3     2     1   
Investing in research and development       7     6     5     4     3     2     1   
Emphasizing education and training of employees  7     6     5     4     3     2     1 
Developing new products/services          7     6     5     4     3     2     1 
Emphasizing advertising and/or sales activities   7     6     5     4     3     2     1   
Building the firm’s and/or product/service image 7     6     5     4     3     2     1   
Maintaining very low-level inventories       7     6     5     4     3     2     1   
Other: _____________           7     6     5     4     3     2     1   
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4.  To what degree do you agree with the statements about your firm’s orientation? (mark one) 
 Increase sales and my customer base (willing to accept low profits in the short/medium term, if  
necessary)  
 Maintain my customer base and obtain moderate profits 
 Maximize profits and revenues in the short to medium term  (willing to reduce customer base if  
necessary) 
 Prepare to sell or close my company or go bankrupt 
 Other--None of the above (please specify):  
5.  To what degree do you agree with the following statements about your firm’s practice? (mark 
one) 
 I manage on a day-to-day basis without a real plan or strategy  
 I make major business decisions only after considering the strategic implications of the decision 
 Without much forethought, I could easily describe my strategy to someone else  
 Most company employees could state our firm’s business strategy   
6. Please indicate your firm’s general practice with the following business activities): 
 Somebody else 
is doing that 
for us 
extensive use 
of computer 
and IT tools 
without use  of 
computer and 
IT tools 
 we do not do 
that 
Research and Development: 
(product development, 
development project management) 
x                  7      6      5      4     3     2     1                   0 
Purchasing/Procurement: (market 
research, purchase planning, 
ordering…) 
x                  7      6      5      4     3     2     1                   0 
Production product/obtaining 
services: (planning, production…) x                  7      6      5      4     3     2     1                   0 
Marketing and Sales: (such as 
marketing research, promoting 
activities, selling …) 
x                  7      6      5      4     3     2     1                   0 
Inventory (warehousing): (such as 
inventory plan, stocks…) x                  7      6      5      4     3     2     1                   0 
Transport: (such as transport 
planning, transport, Transport 
capacities…) 
x                  7      6      5      4     3     2     1                   0 
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Personnel/Human Resources: 
(forecasting labor demand, 
calculation of wages/salaries…) 
x                  7      6      5      4     3     2     1                   0 
Finance and Accounting: (capital 
and cash budgeting, invoicing, 
bookkeeping…) 
x                  7      6      5      4     3     2     1                   0 
Office Administration: 
x                  7      6      5      4     3     2     1                   0 
Managerial (Decision) Support: 
(DSS, EIS, ES...) x                  7      6      5      4     3     2     1                   0 
Communications in a firm and 
with its environment(such as E-
mail, Internet, Intranet...)  
x                  7      6      5      4     3     2     1                   0 
7. Realistically, what do you think are the impacts of IT usage in your firm on: 
in increasing...       strong impact                                 no impact 
The quality of products and/or services    7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Quality of producing products/services    7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Finding new business opportunities    7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Finding new markets      7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Business process redesign     7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Firm’s capabilities to adjust to changes    7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Introducing new products and/or services   7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Introducing new production and business technology   7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Employee satisfaction       7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Customer satisfaction      7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
 in decreasing...       strong impact                               no impact 
Administrative costs      7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Business risk       7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Routine work       7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Number of employees      7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Production and/or service delivery costs    7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Production and/or service delivery time    7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
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8. Please classify where you think your firm’s performance is relative to your competitors’ 
performance: 
                      We’re the best                   We’re the worst   
Sales           7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Sales growth         7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Revenue         7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Growth of revenue        7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Profit           7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Growth of profit        7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Profitability (profit/revenue)        7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Return on assets  (profit/assets)       7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Solvency (Cash flow)        7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Ability to finance business growth with own funds    7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
Firm’s performance in general       7      6      5      4      3      2      1 
9. How many years are you using computers (IT) in your firm: ___ 
10. % of employees, which are responsible for introducing and "operating" (not using) 
computers (and other IT):  ___ 
11. % of employees, which are using computers (and other IT):  ___ 
12. Which of the following statements best reflect your “relation” with IT? (mark one) 
 Information technology is the most important factor for our business 
 Information technology is one of key component of our business strategy 
 Information technology is needed for smooth running of our business activities 
 Information technology is one of means for lowering cost 
 I have a positive attitude about IT, but IT is computer expert’s concern?  
 (potential) IT usage is not my concern 
 
13. How would you describe your opinion regarding funds for information technology? (mark 
one) 
 Information technology is a strategic investment 
 Information technology is a resource, which must be appropriately distributed across a firm 
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 Information technology is a cost, which must be controlled 
14. What kind of vision about IT (usage) you or your firm has: (mark one) 
 Strong and general vision: “We will be leader in our industry concerning IT usage”.  
 Technical vision: “We will implement modern communication network”.   
 Functional vision: “We will exchange the data with our suppliers by EDI”. 
 There is no vision about IT usage within our firm. 
15. How would you describe your firm's use of IT? (Mark one) 
 Industry leader    close follower    middle of the pack     somewhat behind    laggard 
16. Which one the best describes the role of IT in your firm? (Mark one) 
 Integral role: (IT is integral part of the to strategy...)  
 Evolving role: (IT supports strategy...)  
 Traditional role (IT supports operations....) 
17.  Your role in a firm (mark one or more):  
 owner  CEO   manager  employee  other: _______________ 
Thank You for Your Participation 
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Managerial Motivations for UK-Czech Joint Ventures* 
Eleanor M Maitland-Davies, Brian Kenny** 
The paper examines the motives for the choice of the JV instead of other forms 
of investment (e.g. greenfield or licensing) in British investment in the Czech 
Republic.  It is noted that despite popular belief, the level of uptake of JVs in the 
Czech Republic is low in comparison with greenfield investments.  The paper 
identifies organisational motives (resource seeking, synergies, economic and 
historic), partner related motives and exogenous motives.  The role of the 
partner in the choice of the entry mode is emphasised.  Managerial 
implications: despite theoretical benefits of JVs to investor, these might not be 
accrued in practice due to the quality of the resource acquired and difficulties in 
management. 
In dieser Arbeit werden die Motive betrachtet, die zu einer bevorzugten 
Investition britischer Unternehmen in tschechische Joint Ventures im Vergleich 
zu anderen Investitionsformen führen. Im Artikel werden organisatorische 
Motive (Ressourcensuche, Synergien, ökonomische und historische Motive), 
partnerrelevante und exogene Motive identifiziert. Die Rolle des Partners bei 
der Wahl des Zusammenarbeitsmodus wird hervorgehoben. Organisatorische 
Relevanz: trotz der theoretischen Vorteile von Joint Ventures können diese in 
der Praxis oft nicht verwirklicht werden, weil die Qualität der erworbenen 
Ressource und Schwierigkeiten in der Organisation dagegen wirken. 
                                          
* Manuscript received: 7.4.1999, revised: 15.11. 1999, accepted:6.12.1999; 
** Eleanor M Maitland-Davies, born 1971, Lecturer, Huddersfield University Business 
School, Huddersfield, Queensgate, UK, Research topics: FDI in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Joint venture formation and processes; 
Brian Kenny, born: 1935, Reader, Huddersfield University Business School, Huddersfield, 
Queensgate, UK, Research Topics: East and Central Europe transformation, SMEs, 
industry structure/strategy, European defence industry change; 
Managerial Motivations for UK-Czech Joint Ventures 
JEEMS 2/2000 174  
Introduction 
The scope and patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI) in East Central 
Europe (ECE) post-1989 have attracted the attentions of governments and 
academics alike. The focus of much of the work has been on market-orientation 
of FDI and the benefits that FDI can confer on the economies of ECE in relation 
to the transition to a free-market economy (Collins/Rodrik (1991); Welch 
(1993); NERA, 1991; Genco et al. 1993; Deloitte Touche, 1992; Wang, 1993; 
Gatling, 1993; Lyles/Baird, 1994; Rojec/Svetlici 1993; Szanyi, 1994; Arthur 
Anderson, 1994; Meyer, 1995; Ali & Mirza, 1996; Konings/Janssens, 1996; 
Pye, 1998). FDI can be distinguished from portfolio investment as it requires 
that a ‘package’ of assets such as capital, technology, management skills are 
invested outside the home country, but inside the investing country (Dunning, 
1993).  
It is popularly believed that the international joint venture has been in the main 
form of FDI in ECE. Both pre- and post-1989, the JV has been associated with 
Western investment in ECE. Before, it was regarded as one of the few 
mechanisms available to Western firms wishing to access the COMECON 
markets (Young et al. 1989, Artisien, 1983); whereas after, it has been credited 
as being a vehicle which can confer benefits on both Eastern and Western 
parties. Although there are high levels of risk, there are also advantages in 
forming JVs with Eastern firms. Florescu/Scibor-Rylski (1993) noted that there 
should be a good match between the needs of the Eastern and Western firms. 
The West can provide marketing systems, financial management, forecasting, 
planning, technology, information systems, capital, know-how, human resources 
and incentives; while the East is able to contribute land, buildings and 
equipment, distribution networks, skills, low costs, beneficial wage rates, tax 
relief, political connections and neighbouring markets.  
It is perhaps surprising then that JVs per se have not attracted more attention 
from researchers than one might have envisaged. Of late a handful of researchers 
have investigated JVs in detail; for example (Fahy et al., 1998; Lyles/ Baird, 
1994; Cyr, 1997; Lyles/Salk, 1995; Brouthers/Bamossy, 1998).  
Rather than attempt to address JVs across the whole region, the present study 
focuses on a single country market, the Czech Republic. A study extending over 
more than one country would encompass firms from very different historical, 
legislative and environmental background. Such heterogeneity would reduce 
comparability between cases. The specific focus of the research is to explain 
why managers of British firms chose the JV structure as a vehicle for investment 
in the Czech Republic, rather than other forms of investment. Other methods 
of investing in the country are greenfield investments, acquisitions, licensing or 
franchising and many of the benefits of collaboration with a local firm could be 
achieved through these alternative investment modes. For example, resource-
seeking activities could be achieved through acquisition. Access to local market 
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knowledge requirements could be satisfied through market agents. The research 
question is thus: ‘In the specific context of British investment in the Czech 
Republic in the early years of transition, why was the JV selected rather than 
other investment modes?’ The approach adopted here is to investigate the 
motives as perceived and understood by the key managers (hence managerial 
motivations).   
Theoretical perspectives JVs 
The international JV refers to a range of co-operative agreements between two 
or more firms which operate across a national boundary. It is a type of foreign 
direct investment There are a number of definitions of JVs, a strict one being the 
equity JV where two firms combine resources to create a new corporate entity 
over which both firms exert control.  
However, the formation of a ‘new’ entity is not always necessary for a JV. The 
business environment emerging Central and Eastern Europe has spawned a new 
set of relationships between foreign and local firms which have challenged and 
expanded existing definitions (see Davies et al. 1994; Forescu/Scibor-Rylski, 
1993). For example, in CEE the term JV is often used to include partial-
acquisitions where the original owners retain a minority share in their business 
and is renamed the joint venture.  
Notwithstanding, it is helpful to put forward some distinguishing features of 
JVs, these being: 
 shared inputs such as capital, technology, know-how and patents 
 shared outputs such as profits, losses and R&D results 
 sharing of control over decision making 
 capacity and ability to participate in governance (though both partners may 
not actively participate in everyday management)common commercial 
objective 
Theories of JVs  
A distinction is in the literature between ‘theories’ for JVs and ‘motives’ for 
JVs. Kogut (1988) maintains that JVs can be explained by three theoretical 
approaches: transaction costs, strategic positioning/behaviour and organisational 
learning.  
The transaction cost approach attempts to justify the existence of multinational 
companies in terms of imperfect market conditions. The theory argues that 
‘firms choose how to transact according to the criterion of minimising the sum 
of production and transaction costs’ (Kogut, 1988). Beamish/Banks (1987) have 
applied this theory to JVs suggesting the JVs may overcome the transactional 
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problems of opportunism, bounded rationality and small number of market 
agents. They argue that ‘under particular arrangements, the potential threats 
posed (...) can be reduced to a point where JVs become more efficient means of 
dealing with environmental uncertainty and maximising the profit potential of 
the multi-national company’s firm specific assets, even in the face of bounded 
rationality.  
An alternative explanation of joint venture formation can be seen in terms of 
strategic behaviour where firms transact by the mode which maximises profits 
through improving a firm’s competitive position vis-à-vis rivals” (Kogut, 1988). 
Devlin/Bleackly (1988) argue that “strategic alliances” (of which joint ventures 
are a subset) take place in the context of a company’s long term strategic plan to 
improve or dramatically change a company’s competitive position. Hill et al. 
(1990) suggest that global strategic considerations affect the choice of the 
structure or the mode of entry. They argue that the firm’s choice of entry mode 
depends on the strategic relationship it envisages between operations in different 
countries. 
The transfer of knowledge and the learning process are important motives in 
joint venture formation. Knowledge transferred can be technology- or, skills-
based or acquaintance with local markets or regulations. Various authors have 
noted however that joint ventures based on accessing the capabilities of partners 
(whether it be in terms of production techniques or market knowledge) may 
erode over time once the knowledge desired is acquired. This may account for 
why joint ventures are dismantled or the JV is acquired by one or other of the 
original partners. This approach is similar to the resource based view of the firm 
(RBV) perspective which suggests that JVs may represent the optimal mode of 
developing the firm’s resource base as it allows firms to gain knowledge without 
disturbing the balance of social relationships in which knowledge is embedded. 
Strategies for a firm's use of a JV are (i) to gain critical mass in resources; (ii) to 
acquire capabilities through learning; (iii) to generate new proprietary 
capabilities (Badarrocco, 1991).  
Motives for JVs  
In addition to the theoretical contributions to knowledge outlined above, authors 
have more generally listed categories of motives and uses for JVs.  Typical is 
Contractor/Lorange's (1988) identification of seven overlapping objectives. 
These are (i) risk reduction; (ii) economies of scale or rationalisation of 
production; (iii) technology exchanges; (iv) co-opting or blocking competition; 
(v) overcoming government-mandated trade or investment barriers; (vi) 
facilitating initial international expansion of inexperience firms; and (vii) 
vertical quasi-integration advantages of linking the complementary contributions 
of the partners in the value chain. Walmsley (1982) suggests that one of the 
prime advantages of the JV is its clarity of purpose which forces attention on the 
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dominant business purpose. The JV allows parties to clearly state their 
objectives during the negotiations and the JV can adopt its own style. Unlike a 
merger or acquisition, there need not be any 'winners' or 'losers'. Where the JV is 
isolated from existing structures of the participants, both sides are able to 
measure the activity generated. A further advantage of the JV is its flexibility as 
the structure can be moulded to suit a variety of needs.  
It is argued that simply listing ‘motives’, however relevant these may be to 
firms, does not provide a satisfactory theoretical base for JVs (Glaister/Buckley, 
1996). Such an approach does not address the fundamental question of why JVs 
are preferred to alternative forms of governance: be it across the market, or 
through a hierarchy. Table 1 show one interpretation of the way that motives and 
theory might be mapped (Glaister/Buckley, 1996). 
Table 1: Theoretical explanation and strategic motive 
Mainstream Economics – Implied motives 
Risk sharing 
Product rationalisation and economies of scale 
Vertical links 
(Shaping competition) 
Transaction cost explanations – Implied motives 
Risk sharing 
Transfer of technology / exchange patents 
Vertical links 
Resource dependency - Implied motives 
Vertical links 
(Risk sharing) 
Organisational learning - Implied motives 
Transfer of technology / exchange patents 
Facilitate international expansion 
Strategic positioning - Implied motives 
Shaping competition 
Facilitate international expansion 
Consolidate market position 
Source: Glaister/Buckley (1996, p308) 
Foreign Investment in the Czech Republic  
The majority of investment in the countries of ECE has been concentrated in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, having received US$5008m, US$9934 
and US$7389 respectively by 1995. By 1998, the Czech Republic had received 
US$9574.3 million.  
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Unlike other countries in the region, the centre-right government of Vaclav 
Klaus did not offer any incentives to foreign investors on ideological grounds. 
However, after the currency crisis in 1996 and lobbying from agencies 
promoting FDI, the Czech cabinet introduced, in May 1998, a package of 
incentives for domestic and foreign investors willing to invest at least USD25 
mil. into high-tech production in the Czech Republic. The legislation was 
amended in December 1998 to allow smaller investments to qualify for the 
investment incentives. The minimum required investment of US$ 25 million was 
cut to US$ 10 million. At the same time, the maximum amount of job-creation 
grants was raised from CZK 80,000 (approx. US$ 2,500) to CZK 100,000 (US$ 
3,300) per job created. 
Trends in British investment in the Czech Republic are noteworthy. British 
investment in the country was very slow in the early years of transition, the 
British contribution not registering separately in the official statistics. British 
investment accounted for only 1.27% of the total stock of FDI in June 1994, 
although by June 1995, this had risen to 5.36 and by 1997, 15.1%. However, in 
Quarter 3 1998, UK investment accounted for 25.8% of investment in the 
country (CzechInvest, 1998). The reasons for such an increase are not clear. 
Possible explanations might include (i) the active promotion of FDI in the Czech 
Republic by the UK Department of Trade and Industry through its “Open for 
Business Central Europe” programme (ii) the introduction of investment 
incentives by the Czech government and (iii) the change in perception of risk of 
this country in the eyes of British managers.  
Despite the suggestion that the JV is the most popular forms of FDI in the Czech 
Republic, there is little evidence to fully support this claim. Of the Top Ten 
foreign investors, only one matches the definition of an equity JV (two ‘parents’ 
create a third entity). The remainder are either greenfield investments or partial 
acquisitions whereby the foreign investor purchases either a majority or minority 
stake in a local firm. Additionally, of the 55 ‘major projects’ quoted on the web-
site of CzechInvest, 34 firms undertook greenfield investments, 8 firms were 
engaged in technical co-operation and only 3 investments took the form of a JV.  
Methodology 
The research was undertaken among British companies which had established a 
JV with a Czech partner between 1991 and 1995. Hence, these companies can be 
considered to be early investors in the region. This paper forms part of a wider 
research project addressed the formation-process involved in the creation of UK-
Czech JVs. A multiple case study strategy was adopted as it encourages the use 
of mixed-methods. Data were collected using semi-structured interviews, a 
questionnaire and company documentation. The main factors which influenced 
the choice of the case study strategy were: 
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 the complex nature of the information required from the companies 
 the need for flexibility in allowing respondents to place emphasis on aspects 
which he/she deemed to be of importance and relevance, and less emphasis on 
those aspects which held little relevance 
Table 2: Companies and industrial sector 
Group Code Sector 
Manufacturing firms Man1 Automotive 
Components 
 Man2 Automotive 
Components 
 Man3 Castings 
 Man4 Quarrying 
 Man5 Automotive 
Components 
Services S1 Financial Services 
 S2 Architects 
 S3 Insurance 
 S4 Consumer Products 
Project Specific P1 Construction 
 P2 Construction 
Marketing Mk1 Software 
 Mk2 Electronics 
 Mk3 Software 
 Mk4 Building materials 
 Mk5 Building materials 
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 the population of British firms engaged in JVs, as identified , was sufficiently 
small to overcome some of the practical disadvantages such as cost of travel and 
data-overload. 
 evidence of growing 'questionnaire fatigue' amongst the Western business 
community in CEE 
An earlier survey in the research project identified the population of UK-Czech 
JVs (Davies et al. 1994). 19 bone fide JVs were identified of which 16 (84%) 
agreed to participate in the research. It was noted earlier that the British have 
been reluctant to invest in the Czech Republic in the first half of the decade in 
comparison with other countries.  
The data were collected during the summer of 1995 in the UK and Czech 
Republic with British managers who were directly involved with the set-up of 
the JV. The sample covered a number of different industries as shown in Table 
2.  
The interview data were transcribed verbatim and analysed with the assistance 
of the NUD.IST software. 
Findings 
Motives of the choice of the JV factors are separated into organisational, partner 
related and exogenous factors. Organisational drivers to establishing a JV are 
those directly associated with the implementation of the investing firm's 
strategy. Examples are to gain resources not possessed by the firm, reduction of 
cost or to develop synergies with the partner company. Partner related motives 
are those which do not eminate directly from the implementation of the firm’s 
strategy, but recognise the role of the JV partner in the choice of structure. 
Exogenous motives are those factors external to the firm such as political, 
industrial or social factors in the Czech Republic. Table 3 shows the profile of 
motives in each case. 
Organisational Drivers 
Organisational drivers, which refer to motives relating to the implementation of 
a firm's strategy were divided into five categories: Resource Seeking, Synergies, 
Economic, Competitive and Historic factors. 
Resource / Asset Seeking 
The JV is a means of acquiring or gaining access to another firm's resources. 
The skills and resources that the investing firm may wish to access are: physical 
assets, staff, knowledge or commercial relationships. 
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Table 3: Case profile of motives 
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L,P,E: Land, plant and equipment; R: JV partner in related in activity; L: Land; U: JV partner 
in unrelated activity; :Present as a motive 
Physical assets 
Physical assets sought by the British firms in the study include land, plant, 
equipment and premises. The importance of physical assets varied across the 
four groups of companies. For manufacturing firms the JV was predominantly 
used as mechanism for gaining access to, or acquiring, land, plant and 
equipment. It was reported by these companies however that the manufacturing 
capacity provided by the Czech partner was not 'ideal' for the British companies 
and required inputs of technology, modernisation and restructuring of premises, 
workplace and practices. Integral to manufacturing capacity was access to, or 
acquisition of labour. Unemployment levels in the Czech Republic in the early 
years of transition were around the 3% mark. A greenfield investment may not 
have been feasible for the manufacturers since the labour market was rigid and 
immobile. On the other hand, although the JV speeded entry into the market in 
the short term, it did not necessarily facilitate activities in the medium term due 
to the costs (both financial and time) of restructuring.  
For the most part, the type of physical resources sought by the Service firms 
were premises from which to operate. For the two Specific Project firms 
securing access to land for development constituted the very logic of the JV: 
without that land, the JV would not exist.  
In the case of the Marketing firms, the JV partners did provide premises, but 
these were less fundamental to the logic of the JV than for the manufacturing 
JVs. For example, the JV created by Mk2 inherited premises from the Czech 
parent but these were found to be ill-suited to the activities of the JV and the 
company subsequently sought a new site. 
Staff and skills 
Staff and skills were also key resources sought by the British investors. In a 
number of the Marketing JVs, the Czech partner provided staff with specialised 
technical know-how or expertise (for example, in areas such as I.T. applications 
skills). Czech personnel were used to adapt Western technology to local needs, 
providing solutions for Czech customers. This was also evident in the Service 
industry: S3 for example was able to provide the JV with staff with experience 
in the Insurance industry. Additionally, the Manufacturing companies reported 
that one of the attractions of the Czech Republic was its engineering excellence 
(although it might be argued that this is a national characteristic, rather than 
necessarily a characteristic of the partner company).  
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General knowledge of culture and business environment 
Tapping into local market and cultural knowledge was one of the main reasons 
that the British firms chose the JV particularly as investors perceived high levels 
of uncertainty about the cultural and political environment in the transition 
economies. One of the foremost benefits provided by a local partner was the 
knowledge it could provide about that environment.  
Of particular importance to the British firms was the need for assistance in 
navigation through the maze of bureaucracy. The Czechs are traditionally a 
highly bureaucratic people and the legacy of communism left a complex set of 
procedures for operating a business. Obtaining planning permission in Prague 
for example required some 37 permits and without local assistance, functioning 
as a business was almost impossible. The British companies reported that local 
partners needed to both know the system but also be able to operate within that 
system. This inevitably meant having good 'connections' with officials and 
bureaucrats.  
Need for knowledge of the local bureaucracy was both short and long term in 
nature. In the short term, relevant knowledge was required for the initial start-up 
of business activities: registration of the business, renting of premises etc. This 
was the case with S2 who was offered a contract at short notice and required the 
assistance of a local to establish an operating firm. In other cases however, the 
survival of the JV required that regular contact be maintained with local 
officials. This can be seen in the construction industry where P1, whose JV is 
with the local City Council, referred to the difficulty of accomplishing anything 
without the goodwill, active involvement, and blessing of the latter.  
An extension of general cultural knowledge is specific knowledge about a 
particular market. Given the proximity of the State and industry in the 
communist regime, in the early 1990s commercial relationships were still 
closely equated with bureaucratic relationships. Knowledge of 'who is who' and 
'who knows who' was particularly important. A 'sound' bureaucrat in a Ministry 
could greatly enhance one's business opportunities. 
The need for local knowledge was much stronger in the Services and Marketing 
groups than was the case for the Manufacturing companies. 
Commercial relationships / Market access needs 
In some cases, association with a particular Czech company gave the British 
investors distribution networks or, more often, existing commercial 
relationships. In the automotive components industry, these existing commercial 
relationships were key factors in the decision to use a partner. 
Three firms used their JV partner to provide access to markets further East in the 
other CEE countries and Russia, although at times these hopes were dashed: 
Mf3 for example believed initially that its partner would give it access to the 
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Russian markets, but this in reality, did not materialise due to the collapse of the 
Russian defence industry.  
Synergies  
Another reason that investors chose to work with a partner was to develop 
synergies between the firms. Synergies occur where the benefits of collaboration 
outweigh what each partner could achieve individually. An example of such a 
synergistic effect can be seen in the case of P2. The JV partner owned land and 
had vital contacts in the local bureaucracy. P2 on the other hand, had 
development and design expertise. Individually these assets and competencies 
were of limited value: without planning permission, the value of the land was 
not high. Through collaboration, synergistic effects can be seen such that the 
value of the land is higher when the resources are combined rather than when 
they are not.  
In fact, the complementarity of requirements between the Czech and British 
firms was integral to the logic of a number of the JVs. In general, the British 
furnished management skills, marketing knowledge and technology, whereas the 
Czech firm contributed land, labour, local marketing knowledge and 
management potential 
It is a fine line that distinguishes the 'need for resources' categories outlined 
above and creation of synergies between firms. Creating synergies suggests that 
the firm could not develop the advantages alone, or at least not without 
substantial costs. The potential of developing synergies between Czech and 
British firms is high as, in most cases, each firm is able to make a specific 
contribution to the JV, whether it be in terms of assets, management skills or 
market knowledge which the other firm could not provide. Knowledge of a 
particular economic environment may be of little use on its own, but is 
invaluable when combined with technological skills. 
Economic 
The third category in the organisational motives for JVs is 'economic'. The firms 
approached the costs of doing business differently and each firm had its own 
cost, risk and control reward model. In all cases, cost was a significant 
consideration in the JV decision. However, from the sample, it is clear that 
companies had different perceptions of these issues. Three separate issues are 
considered: cost, risk and control. 
Cost 
The 'cost' of the investment was perceived differently by firms. Some firms 
considered the JV to be an increase in cost from a trading relationship. Mk1 only 
agreed to increase its participation (from using an agent to becoming a JV) 
because the increase did not incur additional costs. On the other hand, Mf2 
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chose not to set up a greenfield operation as it was costlier than a JV and Mf3 
selected the JV option, because it was not regarded as expensive at the time. 
Risk 
The issue of risk is multi-dimensional: the firms' perceptions of the risk of a JV 
were influenced by the alternatives available. JVs were perceived to be lower 
risk options compared with the wholly owned subsidiary to some firms. Mf3 
rejected the wholly-owned option considering it too big a risk and Mf4 was also 
unwilling to fully acquire its partner because it was unsure of the political and 
economic conditions in the Czech Republic. Risk reduction was also a 
motivation in the services industry: S4 saw the JV as a safe option and 
considered itself not in the business of risk. 
By contrast, firms more accustomed to arm's length relationships perceived the 
JV as an increase in risk. Mk2 and Mk1 both used a distributor initially in the 
Czech market because it was low risk and only increased their investments when 
(amongst other things) they had gained experience in the market.  
Control  
The third facet of economic motivations was the need to exert control over the 
investment. The control which the JV afforded was perceived in two ways for 
those firms which cited it as a motivating factor. Firstly, some firms compared 
the JV to a franchising and distributorship relationship. In the uncertain 
environment, the JV was seen to offer a greater level of control, and hence 
security, than would have been necessary if investing in a more certain 
environment. Mk4 for example, usually franchised in foreign markets: however, 
it believed that there was insufficient experience of this mode of operating in 
CEE. Despite this company's minority share in the JV company, it felt by 
internalising the JV within the boundaries of the parent company it could exert 
better control over the business. 
From the other perspective it was noted that as the contribution of managerial 
skills was inherent in the logic of the JVs in order to assist the Czech firms 
restructure and transforming itself to compete in a free market economy. Whilst 
a number of authors have noted this, it would appear that this is a particular 
feature of East/West JVs.  
Competitive 
The Czech industry structure and the competitive environment also influenced 
the choice of the JV where the British investors may have preferred total 
ownership. In some cases, the JV conferred benefits that would have been 
unavailable through other entry modes. The JV allowed British firms to gain 
status as "Czech" thus allowing better access to the local market. This was 
particularly so for the automotive components firms with respect to commercial 
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relationships with VW/Skoda. As part of the much publicised JV between the 
German car giant VW and the largest Czech car manufacturer Skoda, the 
German company was required to give commitments to the Czech government 
to support and develop the local components industry. VW had made assurances 
to the Government that it would use Czech suppliers. JV status was thus 
important in allowing two British firms to 'become' Czech so as to develop 
supplier relationship with VW/Skoda. The JV thus improved their competitive 
position in a manner that would not have been possible had they operated on a 
stand-alone basis.  
Historic 
Investment decisions are not always decided on a case by case basis and certain 
firms had a policy of operating JVs in foreign markets. Four of the firms 
reported that they regularly used JVs in foreign markets. This type of motive can 
be regarded as a "rule of thumb" or heuristic. Others however reported that their 
Czech JV was a departure from their 'normal' mode of operations given the 
particular set of environmental circumstances of the Czech Republic.  
Partner related factors 
Firms do not operate in an environmental vacuum and strategic method has to be 
mediated by environmental circumstances: the British investors were rarely able 
to act entirely in their own interests when collaborating with a partner. It may 
have been anticipated, for historical reasons, that the British investors would be 
able to exert power over the local firm. This is partially due to the context of 
rapid privatisation, the collapse of domestic and traditional markets to the East 
and the need of local firms for technology and capital. However, in a number of 
respects, the partner exerted a firm influence on the JV choice. 
Firstly, in a of number cases involving large well-established Czech firms, the 
British parent companies were only one among several potential "suitors" of the 
Czech firm. As part of the privatisation programme, managers and officials from 
local government and the National Property Funds had to decide which route a 
company should take to privatisation. In conditions where there was a high level 
of competition between potential investors, the Czech firms were unwilling to be 
subsumed (through a full acquisition) or to participate together on a trading 
basis. They wished to maintain a degree of autonomy whilst still receiving 
injections of capital and technology. The JV was not so much a matter of choice 
for the British firm, but perhaps the only feasible option.  
In two cases, (Mk1 and Mk3), the ultimate choice of the JV was the result of the 
Czech partners' desire to strengthen and formalise an existing trading 
relationship. Whereas the British parent was content with the original 
distributorship agreement, the Czech partner wanted to increase the 
collaboration between the firms and so pushed to regularise the relationship into 
Eleanor M Maitland-Davies / Brian Kenny 
JEEMS 2/2000 187 
a JV. This type of drive towards the JV has particular significance in the Czech 
Republic. In both cases, local Czech parent companies, against the background 
of privatisation, were keen to lay off staff and reduce costs. The JV was a means 
of detaching a department from the Czech parent and transferring the costs of 
that department onto the investor. 
Another partner-related motive for the choice of the JV was the desire to 
motivate local staff through local ownership. This was particularly important 
where the Czech management was providing knowledge-based skills such as 
applications technology. In cases where the local staff were to manage the day-
to-day running of the JV, part-ownership was perceived to be a mechanism for 
motivating the staff to work in the interests of the JV. In the case of Mk2, the 
local owners were formerly part of the computer department of an existing firm 
and between the three of them raised sufficient capital to invest into the JV. This 
gave the partners a financial interest in making the company work.  
A crucial driver influencing the choice of the JV, which is highly relevant in the 
countries of CEE, was the need to isolate discreet parts of existing firms. Large, 
highly integrated manufacturing companies, had little chance of survival when 
faced with open competition as many of their divisions were loss-making. In 
order to participate with the desired part of the Czech firm, the British investors 
believed that the JV was the only feasible investment option as a full acquisition 
would have to encompass the whole of the firm. In these cases, the acquisition 
was unfeasible both in terms of size of the partner firm, but also the potential for 
future development. This use of the JV has been referred to as ‘cherry-picking’. 
In the case of Mf1, only one division of its Czech partner's firm was profitable 
and the Czech firm insisted that that the JV be used to subsidise the less 
profitable parent company. Basically because of the privatisation process, the 
Czech shareholders recognised that the value lay in the part of the company of 
interest to the UK parent and for the rest of the company to survive, there 
needed to be some subsidy from the financial performance from one part into the 
other. 
By forming a JV, the Western firms were able to work with the parts of the local 
company that had potential without being involved with the larger parent 
company, thus focusing the investment. 
Exogenous factors 
The prevailing socio-political climate also shaped the choice of the joint venture. 
By their nature, such factors are idiosyncratic and are not generalisable across 
the sample.   
External funding. For one of the firms, the choice of the JV was partially 
influenced by external funding available. The JOPP scheme is an EU (PHARE) 
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funded programme which assists companies wishing to JV to research the 
feasibility of the scheme. The money is only available if the investing company 
wishes to form a JV: acquisitions or licensing agreements are not covered. It is 
interesting to note that only one of the firms in the sample used the JOPP 
funding.  
Protection from future indemnities.  In the case of Mf4, the JV was selected to 
protect the indemnities against past environmental damage. The joint venture 
deliberately chosen because the investing firm wanted the government to stay in 
and pick up any past liabilities. The JV provided a vehicle that allowed Mf4 to 
avoid paying for past environmental damage. Many of the firms in the Czech 
Republic, as well as in the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe have 
appalling environmental records as the previous regimes showed scant concern 
about pollution or the environmental effects of heavy industry. An additional 
factor was that the JV partner had been closely involved with the Russian 
defence industry. The firm clearly felt that the infancy of democracy in the 
Czech Republic and the close presence of Russian troops was a delicate political 
situation. More generally, one of the risks for Western firms was the prospect of 
assuming financial responsibility for the clean-up of past environmental damage. 
Whilst only one firm cited the need to keep the government involved in the 
investment as the foremost reason for the choice of the JV as a structure, a 
number of firms saw settlement of the past liabilities as a crucial issue to be 
resolved during the negotiation phase. 
A further socio-political motive for the choice of the JV was the goodwill that 
association with the partner company could convey. Working with a local firm 
through structures such as the JV could prevent accusations that the British 
investor was exploiting local assets. Collaboration with the local firm was seen 
to be expedient in some instances overcoming some of the ill-feeling that may 
be attached locally to the investment, an example being P1's Technology Park. 
Collaboration with a local council reinforced the beneficial nature of the project 
to the local community as a whole, rather than a Western firm buying and 
exploiting the land.  
Managerial implications  
The findings of the current paper are based on a relatively small sample size and 
hence its finding must be treated as exploratory. Nevertheless, the small size is 
consistent with the findings of other researchers who in the region who have 
identified only a limited number of JVs (Fahy et al. 1998; Ali/Mirza, 1996).  
There are clear reasons why a Western firm might wish to establish a JV with 
local firms. These have been summarised in the present paper in terms of 
organisational motives. These include resource seeking activities, synergies, 
economic factors and historic factors.  
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Of particular importance to the British managers was the need for the long term 
co-operation of a local trusted partner was seen especially in terms of plotting a 
course through the complex and unwieldy Czech bureaucracy. This inevitably 
required a partner who not only had a good understanding of the structure of the 
bureaucracy but also connections in it. Such relationships are unlikely to be 
tapped into in an arm’s length relationship.  
The is perceived by managers as a mid-point between full acquisition and arm’s 
length-based relationships. Thus for some firms, the JV was used instead of an 
acquisition in order to minimise the risk of large capital investments. On the 
other hand, other managers found that in the environment of the Czech 
Republic, it was prudent to assume more control than usual as the country’s 
patents and proprietary legislation was still untested.  
Although there might be theoretical benefits to the investing firm, the 
experiences of British managers in the present study suggest that such benefits 
might not be accrued in practice. For example, in many cases the quality of the 
resources acquired (such as plant and equipment) was sufficiently high to allow 
the investor to operate effectively. High levels of additional investment, both 
financial and in time, were required to transform the facilities to allow them 
operate effectively. This might hinder the potential for the JV to be used a 
mechanism to allow rapid access into a market.  
However, there are also strong external factors which influenced the decision to 
joint venture. Whilst it may have been anticipated that Western firms would be 
in a position to exert power over their CEE counterparts, the evidence from this 
study shows that, in a number of cases, it is the local partner which in reality 
played a substantial role in the selection of the final entry mode choice. In some 
cases the choice of the JV was in fact imposed upon a somewhat reluctant 
British firm. In other cases, the choice of the JV was a carefully negotiated 
trade-off between the competing desires of the two firms. In a single case, the 
JV status was selected specifically to protect that firm from future indemnities. 
The role that the local partner plays in the choice of the JV has been neglected 
by the mainstream JV literature which has concentrated largely on the benefits 
accruing to the foreign investor. The qualitative analysis of motives of the JV 
has illustrated clearly some of the characteristics of the Czech environment in 
the early days of transition which had a definite impact upon the choice of mode 
of governance. 
It is interesting to speculate whether this is situation where the investors were 
directly involved and able to exert real influence on shaping the future industrial 
structure of the country.  
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Conclusion 
The qualitative analysis of the motives for JVs presented in this paper provides 
an insight into the effect of reform and transition on entry by structuring the 
motives. It is clear that the choice of the JV is multidimensional, influenced by a 
wide range of motives.  None of these motives alone provides a sufficient 
explanation for the choice of the JV over and above other investment option. 
Rather, the choice of the JV is the outcome of 'bundles' of motives: that is, the 
combination of both organisational, partner related and exogenous motives 
which provides the logic for the JV. 
The paper finds some support for each of the theoretical explanations for JVs 
outlined. From the economic perspective the JV is the mid-way point between 
the market (arms lengths agreements) and the hierarchy (full acquisition). It is 
also used as a means of protecting proprietary knowledge, without the risk 
involved in a full acquisition.  
The JV was perceived as a way of overcoming the firms' lack of knowledge of 
the local environment in line with the organisation learning theoretical 
perspective. Knowledge deficits were in terms of local culture, contacts in 
government and bureaucracy and contact with local buyers. Firms perceived that 
such knowledge could not be acquired externally either due to costs or because 
of the fact that such knowledge is difficult to codify. Organisational 
development was not a feasible option due to time constraints. In this manner, 
the JV confers advantages of cost and speed over other forms of market entry.  
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Book Review 
Martin Myant (ed.), Industrial Competitiveness in East-Central Europe, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA. 
When investigating highly relevant issues of East-Central European economies, 
this book looks beyond the topics that are commonly found and thoroughly, 
albeit sometimes one-sidedly, discussed in many other “area studies”. The editor 
and the contributors – drawn mainly from the Czech Republic, also with 
contributors from Germany and the Slovak Republic, with support from a well-
spent Phare ACE grant – make their point right in the Preface by asserting that 
“The key question is not whether the bare bones of a market system have been 
created, but whether foundations have been laid for sustainable growth and 
rising living standards.” With this assertion, the book challenges the 
conventional view that is also entertained in debates in the EU and in the OECD 
on policy options for the transformational economies, namely that the countries 
concerned, once having gone through the recommended path of stabilization, 
fast privatisation, comprehensive deregulation and abolition of subsidies, should 
experience little problem when facing competitive pressure within the European 
Union.  
It is the concept of competitiveness that has been put in the centre of the studies 
that eventually make up a worthwhile reading volume. With competitiveness in 
the focus of interest, these studies raise some concerns regarding whether the 
economic systems that have been created on what was left behind the collapse of 
planned economies provide sufficient basis for growth and development in the 
years to come. 
Myant, the editor of this volume, argues that becoming “The Tigers of 
Tomorrow” may be too much to expect from Central-East European countries 
when one looks at their growth potential. This leads to a possible critique of 
some of the transformation strategies adopted in these countries, with a highlight 
on the more substantial focus on the institutional framework that can effectively 
promote growth, which in turn calls for a more active role for governments. 
This concerned view gains support from a multi-dimensional study co-authored 
by Zeman, Rodová and Souček on country-competitiveness, which considers 
several indicators – from GDP per capita through unit labour costs to export 
performance. The same study also looks at management strategies – 
unfortunately only in one country, the Czech Republic – with findings that these 
strategies, if any, are often less than impressive. Vintrová and Chvojka then take 
up the themes of macroeconomic structural transformation, and financing of 
restructuring at the level of the firm, respectively. Amongst their many insights, 
both point to sometimes striking differences between countries that might be 
tempting to be seen indistinctively. The relationship between investment and 
restructuring is the subject of the analysis by Ujházy and Zeman, who make a 
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compelling case against, and offer explanations for the lack of, the generalized 
link between investment level and economic growth rate. These comparative 
chapters are followed by three country-studies on Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
and (East) Germany, by Outrata, Myant, and Fleischer and Hornschild, 
respectively. 
Myant concludes the volume by arguing against a naïve and narrow view of 
what transformation should entail. In fact, this last chapter amplifies the message 
of the whole volume that, no matter what optimists may declare from time to 
time, “transformation” (often labelled as “transition” in a simplistic and 
misleading view of what has been happening in the region) is far from over just 
when some basic elements of a market system have been established, and even 
then one can make predictions of only limited value as to where these countries 
will further evolve to. 
The studies included in this volume are rich not only in relevant statistics and 
overviews of recent trends, but also in important insights and far-reaching 
conclusions. This work is undoubtedly an important contribution to our 
understanding of post-communist transformation, and provides guidance for 
thinking about the future. Policy makers at national and EU levels thus should 
also consider the book as a valuable source for shaping policies for sustainable 
growth in Central-Eastern Europe. 
Zoltán Antal-Mokos, Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public 
Administration 
 
News/Information 
JEEMS 2/2000 195 
News / Information 
Conference Report 
Financial Development in Eastern Europe: The First Ten Years 
at 
Klaffenbach Castle, 3-4 February 2000 
This conference on financial sector development in transition economies was 
convened by Adalbert Winkler, who continued the tradition of convening 
international conferences organised through the various appointees to the 
Commerzbank-Visiting-Chair of Money and Finance at Chemnitz University. 
Some fifty researchers from universities, research institutes and international 
financial organisations, central bankers and practitioners in the consulting 
business discussed the extent of monetisation, the intermediation role of 
financial institutions, economic and monetary policy and financial crisis in the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe. The meeting was organised 
in seven sessions over two days. The afternoon of Friday 4 February provided 
comfortable room for intense discussions, framed by discussion panels. 
During a one-hour introductory presentation, Lajos Bokros, director at the 
World Bank and formally Hungarian finance minister, father to Hungary’s 
Austerity Programme of 1995, assessed up-to-date experience with financial 
sector development in the region by grouping individual economies according to 
their achievements in that field. In the most advanced reformers, Poland, 
Hungary and Estonia, foreign involvement in the banking sector is high, the 
quality of assets is good and corporate governance as well as regulation compare 
well to Western standards. Subsequently, capital markets are fairly large and 
liquid, pension reforms and fund management to supplement banks and bourses 
are at an advanced stage. Perhaps surprisingly, the Czech Republic was grouped 
with Slovenia, Latvia and Lithuania as ‘intermediate reformers’; Slovakia, 
Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania were coined as struggling with the double legacy 
of their socialist past paired with insufficient or even bad reforms. In Ukraine 
and Russia, as ‘reluctant reformers’, banks are largely in private hands, yet 
almost all are insolvent. The quality of banks’ portfolios is very poor and 
corruption, crime and cronyism are rampant and financial liberalisation has not 
started yet. Furthermore, non-bank financial intermediation is almost non-
existent. Bokros concluded his lecture by assessing the agenda for the next 
decade of transition with the most important fields of reform being the three 
pillars of enhanced corporate governance, increased competition and more 
prudential regulation and supervision. He stressed that the latter are to some 
extent substitutable. 
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The second session, chaired by Friedrich Thießen from TU Chemnitz, analysed 
the structure and sources of finance for economic activity. Simon Commander 
from the EBRD analysed the rise of money surrogates and non-conventional 
transactions in the goods markets. Today, mostly Russian and Ukraine markets 
rely heavily on barter trade. The underlying question of research conducted by 
the EBRD on innovation in money surrogates is concerned with why the usual 
market price mechanism does not serve to govern the adjustment of output 
according to demand. The origins of barter are traced back to the state’s 
reluctance to enforce timely cash payments for tax and utilities, in part 
motivated by an unwillingness to let poorly performing firms fail. Subsequently, 
the scope for moving away from non-monetary transactions is constrained to 
fiscal and structural reforms, namely the non-acceptance of in-kind and late 
payment by budget and quasi-fiscal institutions as well as a reduction of social 
and political costs of firm exits and restructuring. A monetary solution would 
rather result in inflation and hence further ‘barterisation’ and deterioration in the 
fiscal position. Jens Köke from the Zentrum für Europäische 
Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim, and Tanja Salem from the Centre for 
Transition Economies, Leuven, undertook the task of assessing the effects of 
different modes of corporate finance on corporate restructuring, i.e. investment 
and downsizing, both measured in employment. Using a large data set on 
medium-sized and large enterprises from ten transition economies, they 
determine that the potential for internal finance is limited; Hungary, Poland and 
the Baltic States are the most advanced and economies in South Eastern Europe 
the least advanced ones. In terms of structure, skill-intensive sectors exhibit 
relatively greater potential for internal finance (high number of de novo firms) 
and sectors with sizeable export activities can rely on access to both internal and 
external finance. Not surprisingly, countries and sectors with relatively greater 
access to finance (be it external or internal) relied more on revenue-enhancing 
investment. Countries and sectors with typically higher debt and interest burden 
faced larger pressure to downsize to improve efficiency, indicating a hardening 
budget constraint (with the notable exception of the Czech Republic). 
The Thursday early afternoon session, chaired by Klaus John from TU 
Chemnitz, was concerned with banks and capital markets as financial 
intermediaries. Claudia Buch from the Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel, 
reviewed the experience with foreign banks in transition economies. The 
widespread fear, that domestic banks would not be able to withstand intensifying 
competition due to inherited problems (‘bad assets’) and less experience (the 
learning curve) could be rejected: “the entry of foreign banks has not caused 
large-scale banking failure”. Quite on the contrary, it increased overall banking 
efficiency. In particular, the analysis showed that foreign banks followed some 
form of ‘sequencing’, by which they initially followed their foreign corporate 
clients into the region to slowly expand in small market niches and to finally 
obtain shares in markets with domestic firms and in the deposit business. The 
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Hungarian case highlights that competitive pressure on incumbent banks 
increased only gradually, giving domestic banks time to adjust. Still, Buch 
argued in favour of some compensation of domestic banks for truly inherited 
‘bad loans’ before all entry barriers can be removed. Rüdiger von Rosen from 
the German Financial Equity Institute stressed the decisive role of capital 
markets for growth and structural adjustment in Central Eastern Europe. This is 
especially relevant in view of the typical reluctance of banks to finance venture 
capital in the most dynamic, technological, sectors as well as providing an 
alternative to often insufficiently developed banks. Both reasons are likely to 
remain relevant for the foreseeable future, considering not least that the 
development of Western banking sectors took decades. Today, stock exchanges 
in Central Eastern European economies have grown to significant sizes. For 
further qualitative development, the import of human capital and know-how via 
education of staff by Western experts, organisational and technical support as 
well as legal advice will prove to be more decisive factors than the import of 
foreign capital. 
The late afternoon session on Thursday, chaired by Jens Hölscher from the 
University of Brighton, assessed the properties and implications of financial 
crisis in post-socialist transition economies. Werner Neuhauß from the 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) provided an overview of the engagement 
of the KfW in the region. The institution’s strategy features support for new 
financial institutions, which target small and medium enterprises as well as the 
promotion of development banks. The particular importance of small and 
medium enterprises in the region lies with their dynamic role in economic 
growth and structural adjustment within an unstable financial surrounding. Yet, 
their access to the financial markets is constrained by their typical lack of 
collateral, in Central Eastern Europe predominantly real estate. Here, the KfW 
not only tries to convince domestic banks to service that market but also 
provides additional finance for banks at reduced rates. Strict rules and tight 
supervision of banks as well as the firms involved guaranteed a profitable 
engagement despite the lack of financial stability. Janos Vicze from the National 
Bank of Hungary analysed the financial crisis in Central and Eastern Europe in 
light of the existing theoretic models. He developed an own specification of an 
escape clause model to assess which financial crisis in the region can be 
explained by a deterioration of fundamentals and which were triggered by other 
reasons. His presentation provided an extensive evaluation of financial sector 
development and crises where they happened in Russia, Bulgaria, the Baltic 
states, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. 
In his conclusions, he made a case for a burden sharing between (international) 
creditors and debtors in case of a crisis (‘bail-in problem’). Zbigniew Polanski 
from the National Bank of Poland stylised the Polish case as a role model for 
economic transition and financial institution building without bank or currency 
crisis. The striking stability of Poland’s financial sector despite a very large and 
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still growing current account deficit can be traced back to numerous factors.  
There has to be mentioned Poland’s long standing history of economic reforms, 
the clear vision of goals and the strategy of reforms, the sound sequencing of 
individual reform steps, powerful supervisory institutions and tough regulation 
predominantly in financial markets as well as timely reacting macroeconomic 
policies. In particular, the transition from a rigid currency peg during monetary 
stabilisation to a flexible exchange rate regime today in line with gradual capital 
account liberalisation played an important role in stabilising the markets. During 
the Russian crisis in 1998, Poland was the least affected transition economy, the 
central bank even reduced interest rates. 
The first Friday morning session, chaired by Hubert Gabrisch from the Institute 
for Economic Research Halle, was intended to discuss such aspects of financial 
sector development in transition economies, which play an important role in the 
advisory task of international financial institutions. Gerwin Bell from the 
International Monetary Fund, after briefly dismissing recent calls for a paradigm 
change in the Fund’s agenda, focussed on the link and causality between the 
financial sector and the macroeconomy, especially of course macro adjustment 
programs as promoted by the Fund in transition economies. Stressing that 
financial crisis typically do not emerge without clear disequilibria in 
macroeconomic fundamentals, he supported the view that engagement of foreign 
banks tends to be supportive for financial sector development. IMF experience 
clearly shows that whilst the benefits of financial liberalisation typically 
outweigh the dangers in terms of stability and the danger of crisis, there is no 
place for complacency with respect to reforms of the financial sector. In 
formulating macroeconomic reform programs, particular emphasis has to be 
placed with their effects on the financial sector. Christof Rühl from the World 
Bank, concerned with the ‘bail-in problem’, stylised the Mexican, Asian and 
Russian crisis as examples where private international investors, despite the 
obvious risks involved, were able to escape the crisis without much costs due to 
the bailing out activities of international financial institutions. Relying on these 
institutions, private capital keeps flowing into emerging markets at ever growing 
amounts, a clear case of moral hazard. Hence, investors can rely on receiving 
risk-inflated interest rates quite independent of whether a crisis occurs or not. 
Reviewing experience with crowding-in in the test countries of Pakistan, 
Romania, Ukraine and Ecuador, he concluded that a possible solution could 
involve the introduction of collective-action clauses into loan contracts to make 
restructuring a desirable option long before extraordinary circumstances leave 
no choice. “No longer would the only alternative be paying off creditors in full 
with official funds or enduring a costly, extended interruption to market access”. 
So far, however, not even the Bretton Woods institutions embrace this 
alternative and US American - style bonds, in contrast to the more flexible UK - 
style issues, do not allow any renegotiation - clear fields for future reform. C.P. 
Zeitinger from Internationale Projekt Consult elaborated on his experience with 
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institution-building in the micro-finance sectors of CIS. The usual problems 
associated with business in the region, e.g. criminality and dishonesty, payment 
morale and the Mafia, proved to be of little relevance: “working with small scale 
debtors still produces comfortable returns”, arrears rates turned out to be very 
favourable, collateral also existed to a sufficient value. Dealing with the middle 
class typically allowed to “fly below the radar of the Mafia”. Interestingly, the 
small and micro enterprises paid back their loans even in the midst of the 
Russian financial crisis - an indication for Zeitinger that the small scale market 
provides a less risky business than the usual larger scales as typically targeted by 
international development and commercial banks. 
The late morning session, chaired by Wolfram Schrettl from the Deutsches 
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, laid out the agenda for a panel 
discussion on the central banks’ views on monetary policy in an unstable 
financial system. Peter Bofinger from the University of Würzburg opened the 
discussion by assessing, in an analytic manner, the two extreme options of 
exchange rate policy for transition economies in general and the EU accession 
countries in particular. He made a clear case for some form or other of currency 
peg and dismissed (theoretical) advantages of fully fledged flexible exchange 
rate regimes for these economies. He held the determination of exchange rates to 
be to some degree a random process, econometric evidence can show that there 
does not exist a systematic relationship between the usual fundamentals and the 
exchange rate. Furthermore, Bofinger stressed the often neglected relationship 
between a rigid exchange rate regime, interest rate parities, hence capital inflows 
and the problem of sterilisation for domestic policies geared towards a further 
reduction of price inflation. Assessing regime-options for each of the EU 
accession economies, he in particular expressed his concerns with Poland’s path 
of inflation targeting paired with a (practically) free floating exchange rate. In 
this conjunction Japan was a point of reference. The panellists Peter Backé, 
Österreichische Nationalbank, Polanski and Vincze largely agreed with 
Bofinger’s case against an unmanaged free floating exchange rate. Yet Polanski 
reminded the conference delegates that Poland made positive experience with a 
practically unmanaged free float of the Zloty in the most recent past and 
particularly during the Russian crisis. Vincze suggested a more gradual view, 
incorporating both, inflation and exchange rate targets: as monetary stability sets 
in, Hungary plans to shift step-by-step from the contemporary exchange rate 
target to a more domestically oriented monetary policy. He held the 
abandonment of any exchange rate motive as a sign of maturity to enter the 
European Monetary Union. Backé critically assessed the existing framework for 
eventual European Monetary Union membership as lacking provisions in case of 
currency crisis, lacking a scenario of an emerging system of parallel currency 
and, remarkably for a central banker’s view, that the inflation criteria might be 
“unduly constraining for catching-up economies”. 
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The final Friday afternoon session, chaired by Reinhard Schmidt, University of 
Frankfurt, incorporated the commercial bank’s view on financial development in 
the region. The contribution of Monika Schnitzer from the Ludwig Maximilian 
University, Munich, took issue yet again with the possible trade-off between 
(foreign) competition and stability of the banking sector. By distinguishing 
between the long and the short term, she held that at least in the long run, 
competition can be expected not only to promote stability, but least as 
importantly also efficiency. Today, financial sectors in the region are largely 
‘overbanked’ but ‘underserviced’. In respect to measuring competition, the 
particular structures in Central and Eastern Europe suggest to focus on how 
heterogeneous banks really are, the degree of market segmentation and the 
relationship between bank and firm managers. Hence, competition can be 
enhanced even by further consolidation, paired with the pressure for higher 
efficiency by the entry of foreign banks. The panellists, Jürgen Conrad from the 
Deutsche Bank Research, Harald Eggerstedt, Commerzbank and Martin 
Holtmann, Russia Small Business/IPC) discussed this thesis against their 
individual professional background in the region. Conrad asked for more 
country specific analysis rather than the up to date often biased cross-country 
analysis in assessing financial development and competition in the financial 
sector in Central and Eastern Europe. Holtmann informed the delegates about 
his experience with the promotion of inter-bank competition in Russia. Here, 
interest rates did come down and more clients or client groups have been 
serviced by that industry already before the financial crisis broke out. In contrast 
to the discussion during the conference up till then, he however held that the 
entry of foreign banks could in so far be detrimental to domestic financial 
development, as these banks often tend to ‘skim off’ the best customers, leaving 
the less interesting ‘crumbs’ to domestic competitors. Eggerstedt broadened the 
discussion by focussing on the puzzling observation that the securities markets 
were not really taking off in the region and suggested that this might be rooted 
in a typical sequencing in financial market development. 
The conference closed with concluding remarks by all panellists of the 
afternoon. Some controversial issues remained unresolved which was in line 
with the conference convenor’s intention, Adalbert Winkler, by inviting a divers 
audience such as theorists from academia, representatives from international 
financial institutions and commercial banks as well as consultants to Chemnitz 
University. A volume with the proceedings of the conference, in particular 
incorporating the panel discussions, will be published in due course. 
Johannes Stephan, Halle Institute for Economic Research 
Jens Hölscher, University of Brighton 
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Calls for Papers 
 
IACCM Annual Meeting 
from 29-30 September 2000 
in Zagreb 
As always we call for original papers reflecting the aims of the Association and 
the interest and the specialism of ist members. All papers for presentation will 
be issued at the beginning of the conference in the form of proceedings. 
After all presentations the International Editorial Board of the Journal of the 
IACCM will select the best papers to publication, subject to recommended 
revision, in the journal. 
Papers may be in German or English. 
Deadlines 
Registration for the conference: 15.05.2000 
Submission of abstracts: 16.06.2000 
Full paper: 01.09.2000 
Should you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact us: 
Gilda Kasmaei phone: ++43 1 31336/4314 
International Studies Centre 
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien fax: ++43 1 31336/752 
Augasse 2-6 e-mail: 
A - 1090 Wien, Austria Gilda.Kasmaei-Tehran@wu-wien.ac.at 
 
 
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V. Chemnitzer Ostforum 
21. - 23. März 2001 
"Personalmanagement im Transformationsprozeß" 
„Die Mitarbeiter sind unsere wichtigste Ressource“, solche oder ähnliche Aussagen erhält 
man heute permanent von Unternehmen. Doch wie sieht es mit den Mitarbeitern aus, wenn 
Unternehmen in grundlegende gesellschaftliche Transformationsprozesse eingebunden sind? 
Wie gestaltet sich das Verhältnis von Führungskräften und Mitarbeitern, welchen Einfluß 
haben Gewerkschaften und andere Verbände in Zeiten radikalen Wandels? Wie erfolgt die 
notwendige Personalanpassung und welche Rolle spielt die Personalentwicklung? Welche 
Beiträge kann ein Personalmanagement leisten, das selbst vom Umbruch betroffen ist? 
Welche Rolle spielen Expatriates und welche Beiträge zur Bewältigung leisten in westlichen 
Unternehmen bewährte Managementkonzepte und -instrumente? Zu diesen und anderen 
Fragen sollen Beiträge eingereicht werden, die sich auf eines der folgenden sechs 
Themenfelder beziehen sollen: 
1. Personalführung, Personalentwicklung 
2. Personalbeschaffung/-auswahl, 
Anreizsysteme 
3. Industrielle Beziehungen 
 
4. Restrukturierung, Personalanpassung 
5. Organisationsentwicklung und 
Kulturwandel 
6. Institutionelle und personelle Aspekte des 
Personalmanagements 
Kurzfassungen der Beiträge (500 Wörter), inklusive Name(n) des/der Autors/Autoren, 
akademischer Grad/Position, Name der Institution, Adresse, Telefon- und Faxnummer, 
Email-Adresse sowie das Themenfeld auf das sich die Kurzfassung bezieht, senden Sie bitte 
an das Organisationskomitee (1 Ausdruck und 1 Diskette). 
Die Kurzfassungen müssen bis zum 31. August 2000 bei uns eingetroffen sein. Alle Autoren 
werden bezüglich der Annahme/Ablehnung ihres Beitrages bis zum 31. Oktober 2000 
benachrichtigt.  
Der Konferenzbeitrag beträgt 250 DM. Teilnehmern aus osteuropäischen Staaten werden im 
Rahmen der Möglichkeiten der Konferenzbeitrag sowie die Reise- und Aufenthaltskosten 
erstattet. 
Weitere Informationen erhalten Sie unter folgender Adresse: 
Organisationskomitee, z. Hd. Ingo Winkler  
Technische Universität Chemnitz Tel.: +49 (0)371 531-4159 oder –4152 
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften Fax: +49 (0)371 531-3987 
Reichenhainer Straße 39 Email: ingo.winkler@wirtschaft.tu-chemnitz.de 
09107 Chemnitz, Deutschland Web: http://www.tu-chemnitz.de/wirtschaft/bwl5/ 
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V Chemnitz East Forum 
21 - 23 March 2001 
 „Human Resource Management in Transition“ 
“Employees are our most important resource”, such are the statements one hears from 
enterprises today. However, how about the employees if enterprises are involved in 
fundamental societal transformation processes? How is the relationship between executives 
and other staff organised? To which extent do unions and other associations have influence in 
times of radical change? How does the necessary adjustment of the staff take place and which 
role does staff development play? Which contribution can human resource management make 
which is undergoing a process of transition itself? Which role do expatriates play and which 
contributions do established western management concepts and instruments render in coping 
with transition? Conference contributions on these and other topics should focus one of the 
following areas: 
1. Personnel management and staff 
development 
2. Recruiting and personnel selection, 
incentive systems 
3. Industrial relations 
4. Restructuring, personnel adjustment 
5. Organisation development and cultural 
change 
6. Institutionell and personnel aspects of 
HRM 
Abstracts of paper presentations (500 words) should be sent to the organising committee 
(1 printout and 1 file on disk). Abstracts should contain author(s) name(s), title/position, 
institution, address, telephone, fax number and email address and the area the paper is 
referring to.  
Abstract submissions should be submitted by 31 August 2000. All authors will be notified of 
the acceptation/rejection of their abstracts until 31 October 2000.  
The conference fee is 250 DM. As far as possible participants from Eastern Europe countries 
will receive their conference fee and their travel and accommodation expenses refunded.  
For further information, please contact: 
Organising Committee, Mr. Ingo Winkler  
Chemnitz University of Technology Phone: +49 (0)371 531-4159 oder –4152 
,Faculty of Economics and Business 
Administration, Fax: +49 (0)371 531-3987 
Reichenhainer Straße 39 Email: ingo.winkler@wirtschaft.tu-chemnitz.de 
09107 Chemnitz, Germany 
Web: 
http://www.tu-chemnitz.de/wirtschaft/bwl5/ 
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Preis für die besten Beiträge junger Wissenschaftler  
Best Paper Award for Young Scholars  
V Chemnitz East Forum 
21 - 23 March 2001 
 „Human Resource Management in Transition“ 
Das Journal for East European Management Studies lobt einen Preis für die 
besten Beiträge  junger Wissenschaftlers aus, die für die Konferenz eingereicht 
wurden. Die Bewerber dürfen maximal 30 Jahre alt sein. Die Preisträger erhalten 
die Möglichkeit kostenlos am V. Chemnitzer Ostforum teilzunehmen. Weiterhin 
werden die besten von ihnen in einem JEEMS-Sonderheft publiziert.  
Wir fordern junge Wissenschaftler auf, Beiträge einzureichen. Vermerken Sie 
dazu auf Ihrem Konferenzbeitrag, daß sie sich für den Preis für das beste Papier 
bewerben möchten. 
The Journal for East European Management Studies announces an award for the 
best papers submitted to the V Chemnitz East Forum by young scholars. 
Candidates should be 30 years of age or less. The winners will have the 
opportunity to participate in the conference for free. Additionally the best papers 
will be published in a special JEEMS-issue. 
We invite young scholars to submit papers for the award. Please note on your 
conference paper that you would like to take part in the contest. 
Weitere Informationen erhalten Sie unter folgender Adresse / For further 
information, please contact: 
Organising Committee, Mr. Ingo Winkler 
Chemnitz University of Technology 
,Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, 
Reichenhainer Straße 39 
09107 Chemnitz, Germany 
Phone: +49 (0)371 531-4159 oder –4152 
Fax: +49 (0)371 531-3987 
Email: ingo.winkler@wirtschaft.tu-chemnitz.de 
Web: http://www.tu-chemnitz.de/wirtschaft/bwl5/ 
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RENT XIV Research in Entrepreneurship and Small Business 
November 23-24, 2000 in Prague 
E
A
I
S M
Net working since 1971 
Most European countries are increasingly hard pressed to address the issues of growth, 
productivity, unemployment and global competitiveness in the information integrated, 
significantly global environment. Small and medium enterprise (SME) cooperative networks 
provide viable and complementary alternatives to traditional economic patterns and offer new 
solutions and perspectives on the crucial problems of long-term economic health and 
sustainability.  
Usually the workshop welcomes papers on any aspect of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs), Entrepreneurship and Regional Economics. However, the world in which 
entrepreneurs and SMEs operate has changed fundamentally in the era of Internet, global 
markets and the New Economy of networks. We have therefore selected NETWORKS to 
become the central focus of our discussions in Prague: 
The above themes could be expressed through the following specific topics of interest: 
 SMEs and the Internet 
 SME Networks 
 E-business and E-
engineering of enterprise 
 From MBA to E-MBA 
education 
 Regional advantages of 
SMEs 
 Inter- and intra-company 
organization 
 SME financing and 
capitalization 
 Knowledge management 
for SMEs 
 SMEs in post-communist 
economies 
 EU, SMEs and public 
policy 
 Initial public offering 
(IPO) management 
 Strategic aspects of SME 
alliances  
 Franchising, networking 
and cooperation 
 High-technology regions 
and “silicon valleys” 
Deadline for three page abstracts in English (including full address, telephone, fax numbers 
and Email address): July 1st , 2000. 
Prof. Hans Landstrom Ms Graziella Michelante 
Halmstad University – SIRE EIASM Conference Manager 
PO Box 823 Rue d’Egmont-straat 13 
30118 Halmstad, Sweden 1000 Brussels, Belgium 
phone: 46 35 167100 phone: 32 2 5119116 
fax: 46 35 148533 fax: 32 2 5121929 
e-mail: hans.landstrom@ec.hh.se e-mail: michelante@eiasm.be 
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Fourth International Conference 
Enterprise in Transition - Competitiveness, restructuring and growth 
May 24-26, 2001 in Split 
The Fourth International Conference on Enterprise in Transition will focus on the problems of 
enterprise competitiveness, restructuring and growth. 
In addition to the discussion of the transition from a socialist toward a market economy, we would like 
to encourage and invite authors to consider the issues relating to the growth and development of 
enterprises and economies in transition. Such an orientation of the Conference encompasses many 
different research themes, which reflects our comprehensive approach to transitional problems, which 
have been key features of the Conference from its very beginning. Some of the issues we propose for 
discussion are: 
Competitiveness: 
 Determinants, indicators and 
measures of competitiveness; 
 Technology, technical 
progress and competitiveness; 
 Industrial policy and 
international competitiveness; 
 Competitive strategies of 
contemporary enterprises; 
 Management systems and 
enterprise competitiveness. 
 
Restructuring: 
 Company restructuring in 
the context of the process of 
globalisation; 
 Privatization and 
restructuring of state-owned 
enterprises; 
 Innovation, networks and 
entrepreneurship; 
 Regional development and 
restructuring of local economies; 
 Industrial restructuring and 
its effect on development. 
 
Growth: 
 Financing entrepreneurial 
growth and SME development; 
 Direct foreign investment 
and its effects; 
 Implications and effects of 
cooperation with the EU on 
growth in transition economies; 
 Sustainable growth: a green 
paradigm for the countries in 
transition;  
 Models and theories of 
growth for countries in 
transition. 
Deadlines: 
Abstract submission deadline: 30th August 2000. 
Paper submission deadline: 31st December 2000. 
Contact 
Organising Commitee of the International 
Conference “Enterprise in Transition” 
Faculty of Economics Split 
Radovanova 13 
HR 21000 Split, Croatia 
phone: +385 21 362 465, + 385 21 366 033 
fax: +385 21 366 026 
email: eitconf@efst.hr 
web: http://www.efst.hr/eitconf 
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